Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
Authors:
- Attila AmbrusAAAttila Ambrus
- Ben GreinerBGBen Greiner
- 1 October 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 178
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Australian Research Council (DP150104169)
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