Ben Greiner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ben Greiner has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Department of Management, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1020 Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Anita Zednik
Institute for Markets and Strategy, Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1020 Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication Anne Sastro
University of New South Wales, School of Economics, UNSW, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
1 shared publicationAttila Ambrus
1 shared publication- Attila József Ambrus
University of Pecs
1 shared publication - Axel Ockenfels
Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 302-322
Incentives, Framing, and Reliance on Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental Study
Managerial decision makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies, but they are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision makers’ reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1,500 participants, we find that compared with a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in effort duration and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as also incorporating human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices, such as incentives and task framing, influence the interaction of human decision makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02777 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 302-322
Top Cited PapersIncentives, Framing, and Reliance on Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental Study
Managerial decision makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies, but they are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision makers’ reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1,500 participants, we find that compared with a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in effort duration and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as also incorporating human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices, such as incentives and task framing, influence the interaction of human decision makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02777 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (3) , 1343-1356
Reproducibility in Management Science
With the help of more than 700 reviewers, we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hardware and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewers, the results of more than 95% of articles under the new disclosure policy could be fully or largely computationally reproduced. However, for 29% of articles, at least part of the data set was not accessible to the reviewer. Considering all articles in our sample reduces the share of reproduced articles to 68%. These figures represent a significant increase compared with the period before the introduction of the disclosure policy, where only 12% of articles voluntarily provided replication materials, of which 55% could be (largely) reproduced. Substantial heterogeneity in reproducibility rates across different fields is mainly driven by differences in data set accessibility. Other reasons for unsuccessful reproduction attempts include missing code, unresolvable code errors, weak or missing documentation, and software and hardware requirements and code complexity. Our findings highlight the importance of journal code and data disclosure policies and suggest potential avenues for enhancing their effectiveness. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, behavioral economics and decision analysis–fast track. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03556 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (3) , 1343-1356
Reproducibility in Management Science
With the help of more than 700 reviewers, we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hardware and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewers, the results of more than 95% of articles under the new disclosure policy could be fully or largely computationally reproduced. However, for 29% of articles, at least part of the data set was not accessible to the reviewer. Considering all articles in our sample reduces the share of reproduced articles to 68%. These figures represent a significant increase compared with the period before the introduction of the disclosure policy, where only 12% of articles voluntarily provided replication materials, of which 55% could be (largely) reproduced. Substantial heterogeneity in reproducibility rates across different fields is mainly driven by differences in data set accessibility. Other reasons for unsuccessful reproduction attempts include missing code, unresolvable code errors, weak or missing documentation, and software and hardware requirements and code complexity. Our findings highlight the importance of journal code and data disclosure policies and suggest potential avenues for enhancing their effectiveness. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, behavioral economics and decision analysis–fast track. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03556 .
- Open Access
- 28 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 206, 251-261
On the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces
- 28 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 206, 251-261
Open AccessOn the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 178
Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 178
Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 181, 37-39
Trust and age: An experiment with current and former students
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 181, 37-39
Trust and age: An experiment with current and former students
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (9) , 4009-4031
Dispute Resolution or Escalation? The Strategic Gaming of Feedback Withdrawal Options in Online Markets
Many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity to withdraw negative reputational feedback in a dispute resolution phase. Motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical considerations, we use laboratory markets with two-sided moral hazard to show that this option, contrary to the intended purpose, produces an escalation of dispute. The mutual feedback withdrawal option creates an incentive to leave negative feedback, independent of the opponent’s behavior, to improve one’s bargaining position in the dispute resolution phase. This leads to distorted reputation information and less trust and trustworthiness in the trading phase. Buyers who refuse to give feedback strategically, even when it comes at a personal cost, mitigate the detrimental impact. It is also mitigated in markets with one-sided moral hazard and a unilateral feedback withdrawal option. The supplementary appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2802 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (9) , 4009-4031
Dispute Resolution or Escalation? The Strategic Gaming of Feedback Withdrawal Options in Online Markets
Many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity to withdraw negative reputational feedback in a dispute resolution phase. Motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical considerations, we use laboratory markets with two-sided moral hazard to show that this option, contrary to the intended purpose, produces an escalation of dispute. The mutual feedback withdrawal option creates an incentive to leave negative feedback, independent of the opponent’s behavior, to improve one’s bargaining position in the dispute resolution phase. This leads to distorted reputation information and less trust and trustworthiness in the trading phase. Buyers who refuse to give feedback strategically, even when it comes at a personal cost, mitigate the detrimental impact. It is also mitigated in markets with one-sided moral hazard and a unilateral feedback withdrawal option. The supplementary appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2802 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
- Open Access
- 29 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 26 (S3) , 21-35
Separation of prescription and treatment in health care markets: A laboratory experiment
Summary: Health care is a credence good, and its market is plagued by asymmetric information. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to test the performance of a potential remedy discussed in the applied literature, the separation of prescription and treatment activities. We observe a significant amount of overtreatment (and a smaller nonpredicted amount of undertreatment) in our baseline environment. Requiring a different than the treating physician to provide diagnosis and prescription for free is an effective way to reduce overtreatment in our laboratory setting. This effect, however, is partially offset by an increased frequency of undertreatment. Allowing prescription and treatment physicians to independently set prices for their services reduces efficiency due to coordination failures: In sum, prices are often higher than expected benefit of patients, who in turn do not attend to the physician. Also contrary to theory, bargaining power does not play a significant role for the distribution of profits between physicians.
- 29 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 26 (S3) , 21-35
Open AccessSeparation of prescription and treatment in health care markets: A laboratory experiment
Summary: Health care is a credence good, and its market is plagued by asymmetric information. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to test the performance of a potential remedy discussed in the applied literature, the separation of prescription and treatment activities. We observe a significant amount of overtreatment (and a smaller nonpredicted amount of undertreatment) in our baseline environment. Requiring a different than the treating physician to provide diagnosis and prescription for free is an effective way to reduce overtreatment in our laboratory setting. This effect, however, is partially offset by an increased frequency of undertreatment. Allowing prescription and treatment physicians to independently set prices for their services reduces efficiency due to coordination failures: In sum, prices are often higher than expected benefit of patients, who in turn do not attend to the physician. Also contrary to theory, bargaining power does not play a significant role for the distribution of profits between physicians.
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 154, 34-48
The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 154, 34-48
The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems