Fickle for Survival: Bayesian Persuasion by a Strategic Regime
Authors:
Preprint
- 26 December 2018
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study a regime change model where many citizens, who are imperfectly informed about the regime's strength, decide whether to participate in a revolt. The regime can commit to a strength-dependent information release policy of either truthfully announcing its strength or sending mixed messages, in order to maximize its ex-ante probability of survival. The game among citizens has a generically unique equilibrium, given their political stance between loyalist and revolutionist which determines the pattern of coordination. We also explicitly characterize the regime's optimal persuasion scheme. At optimum, the regime's tendency of being honest is higher when the regime is relatively more malicious, but is not necessarily so when it becomes stronger or when more citizens are revolutionists. When political stance is a choice, no citizen will choose to become a revolutionist even if doing so incurs only a small positive cost. In other words, even if under an evil autocratic regime, a little spark of resistance can hardly start a mighty flame of revolution among rational people.Keywords
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- THE POWER OF WHISPERS: A THEORY OF RUMOR, COMMUNICATION, AND REVOLUTION*International Economic Review, 2016
- Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian RegimesPolitical Science Research and Methods, 2015
- Government control of the mediaJournal of Public Economics, 2014
- Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic ControlAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2014
- Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*Review of Economic Studies, 2013
- Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel DataAmerican Political Science Review, 2009
- Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy TrapsJournal of Political Economy, 2006
- RumorsThe Journal of Finance, 2003
- Global Games and Equilibrium SelectionEconometrica, 1993
- The Economics of RumoursReview of Economic Studies, 1993