Yangbo Song
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yangbo Song has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mihaela van der Schaar
University of Cambridge
4 shared publications Mofei Zhao
3 shared publicationsDavid McAdams
1 shared publication- Dihan Zou
Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA
1 shared publication Fei Li
1 shared publicationJiahua Zhang
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Learning-Optimal Design of Data Markets
We study the design of data markets with strategic role selection. A continuum of agents receives private signals about an uncertain state and chooses whether to become sellers who trade their signals for monetary revenue, buyers who acquire sellers' signals and act based on two signals, or non-participants who rely solely on their own information. Each agent prefers a state-matching action. A market designer commits to a transfer function to maximize information aggregation. For state-independent markets, where transfers depend only on agents' roles and the aggregate measures of buyers and sellers, such as standardized data trading platforms, we show that a robust ``digital market for lemons'' emerges even under optimal design: the least informed agents sell, moderately informed agents buy, and the most informed agents opt out. In contrast, state-dependent markets that link sellers' revenue to the realized state, as in blockchain-enabled networks with data-quality-based rewards, can reverse this role distribution and restore efficiency. Under the optimal design, the most informed agents sell their signals to all others, whose aggregate action achieves the highest expected payoff among all single-transaction markets. Moreover, while optimal state-independent markets may require subsidies, optimal state-dependent markets generate non-negative profits for the designer.
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLearning-Optimal Design of Data Markets
We study the design of data markets with strategic role selection. A continuum of agents receives private signals about an uncertain state and chooses whether to become sellers who trade their signals for monetary revenue, buyers who acquire sellers' signals and act based on two signals, or non-participants who rely solely on their own information. Each agent prefers a state-matching action. A market designer commits to a transfer function to maximize information aggregation. For state-independent markets, where transfers depend only on agents' roles and the aggregate measures of buyers and sellers, such as standardized data trading platforms, we show that a robust ``digital market for lemons'' emerges even under optimal design: the least informed agents sell, moderately informed agents buy, and the most informed agents opt out. In contrast, state-dependent markets that link sellers' revenue to the realized state, as in blockchain-enabled networks with data-quality-based rewards, can reverse this role distribution and restore efficiency. Under the optimal design, the most informed agents sell their signals to all others, whose aggregate action achieves the highest expected payoff among all single-transaction markets. Moreover, while optimal state-independent markets may require subsidies, optimal state-dependent markets generate non-negative profits for the designer.
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 153, 451-473
Social learning among opinion leaders
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 153, 451-473
Social learning among opinion leaders
- Open Access
- 14 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 224
Network-based peer monitoring design
- 14 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 224
Open AccessNetwork-based peer monitoring design
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 76 (4) , 1289-1327
Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 76 (4) , 1289-1327
Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 207
Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 207
Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 207
Global manipulation by local obfuscation
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 207
Global manipulation by local obfuscation
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 81-100
Social learning with coordination motives
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 81-100
Social learning with coordination motives
- 19 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 49 (2) , 345-384
Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
- 19 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 49 (2) , 345-384
Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
- Open Access
- 26 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Fickle for Survival: Bayesian Persuasion by a Strategic Regime
We study a regime change model where many citizens, who are imperfectly informed about the regime's strength, decide whether to participate in a revolt. The regime can commit to a strength-dependent information release policy of either truthfully announcing its strength or sending mixed messages, in order to maximize its ex-ante probability of survival. The game among citizens has a generically unique equilibrium, given their political stance between loyalist and revolutionist which determines the pattern of coordination. We also explicitly characterize the regime's optimal persuasion scheme. At optimum, the regime's tendency of being honest is higher when the regime is relatively more malicious, but is not necessarily so when it becomes stronger or when more citizens are revolutionists. When political stance is a choice, no citizen will choose to become a revolutionist even if doing so incurs only a small positive cost. In other words, even if under an evil autocratic regime, a little spark of resistance can hardly start a mighty flame of revolution among rational people.
- 26 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFickle for Survival: Bayesian Persuasion by a Strategic Regime
We study a regime change model where many citizens, who are imperfectly informed about the regime's strength, decide whether to participate in a revolt. The regime can commit to a strength-dependent information release policy of either truthfully announcing its strength or sending mixed messages, in order to maximize its ex-ante probability of survival. The game among citizens has a generically unique equilibrium, given their political stance between loyalist and revolutionist which determines the pattern of coordination. We also explicitly characterize the regime's optimal persuasion scheme. At optimum, the regime's tendency of being honest is higher when the regime is relatively more malicious, but is not necessarily so when it becomes stronger or when more citizens are revolutionists. When political stance is a choice, no citizen will choose to become a revolutionist even if doing so incurs only a small positive cost. In other words, even if under an evil autocratic regime, a little spark of resistance can hardly start a mighty flame of revolution among rational people.
- 7 October 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 6 (4) , 812-823
Repeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality
Three kinds of activities happen in a network: agents link or unlink, agents act, and agents observe and learn. The existing literature on network formation, on network games, and on monitoring in networks studies each of these in isolation. We propose a framework in which these happen together. In our model, agents repeatedly choose to whom they link and the actions they take with their neighbors. Agents learn by observing links, actions of their neighbors, and (perhaps) from a public signal. We dene a repeated network game and an equilibrium of this game. An essential feature is that the network formed and hence the games played are determined endogenously and may be different at each moment of time. Equilibrium networks and actions are strongly inter-dependent. When a dominant action is available to each agent and each agents individual rationality is satisfied, we prove a Convergence Theorem that characterizes the networks and actions that persist in the steady-state. We also show endogenously formed networks with the associated action proles often yield a higher social welfare than exogenously prescribed ones. Finally, we show that in the absence of an informative monitoring structure, cooperation in sparse networks may fail even when agents are patient.
- 7 October 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 6 (4) , 812-823
Repeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality
Three kinds of activities happen in a network: agents link or unlink, agents act, and agents observe and learn. The existing literature on network formation, on network games, and on monitoring in networks studies each of these in isolation. We propose a framework in which these happen together. In our model, agents repeatedly choose to whom they link and the actions they take with their neighbors. Agents learn by observing links, actions of their neighbors, and (perhaps) from a public signal. We dene a repeated network game and an equilibrium of this game. An essential feature is that the network formed and hence the games played are determined endogenously and may be different at each moment of time. Equilibrium networks and actions are strongly inter-dependent. When a dominant action is available to each agent and each agents individual rationality is satisfied, we prove a Convergence Theorem that characterizes the networks and actions that persist in the steady-state. We also show endogenously formed networks with the associated action proles often yield a higher social welfare than exogenously prescribed ones. Finally, we show that in the absence of an informative monitoring structure, cooperation in sparse networks may fail even when agents are patient.