Axiomatic Tools for Separating Electoral Control Types, with Applications to Concrete Systems
Authors:
- Michael C. ChavrimootooMCMichael C. Chavrimootoo
- Ian ClingermanICIan Clingerman
- Ethan FerlandEFEthan Ferland
- Erin GibsonEGErin Gibson
- Lane A. HemaspaandraLHLane A. Hemaspaandra
- Quan LuuQLQuan Luu
- David E. NarváezDNDavid E. Narváez
- Yanfei WangYWYanfei Wang
- 13 November 2026
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 197-212
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
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