LHLane A. Hemaspaandra

Lane A. Hemaspaandra

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Lane A. Hemaspaandra has a total of 136 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Axiomatic Tools for Separating Electoral Control Types, with Applications to Concrete Systems

    by Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Ian Clingerman, Ethan Ferland, Erin Gibson, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Quan Luu, David E. Narváez, Yanfei Wang


  • Open Access

    Search Versus Search for Collapsing Electoral Control Types

    by Benjamin Carleton, Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, David E. Narváez, Conor Taliancich, Henry B. Welles

    Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections by altering aspects of their composition and structure [6]. We say two compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the same election system $$\mathcal {E}$$ E form a collapsing pair if for every possible input (which typically consists of a candidate set, a vote set, a focus candidate, and sometimes other parameters related to the nature of the attempted alteration), either both or neither of the attempted attacks can be successfully carried out (see the Preliminaries for a more formal definition) [31]. For each of the seven general (i.e., holding for all election systems) electoral control type collapsing pairs found by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [31] and for each of the additional electoral control type collapsing pairs of Carleton et al. [10] for veto and approval (and many other election systems in light of that paper’s Theorems 3.6 and 3.9), both members of the collapsing pair have the same complexity since as sets they are the same set. However, having the same complexity (as sets) is not enough to guarantee that as search problems they have the same complexity. In this paper, we explore the relationships between the search versions of collapsing pairs. For each of the collapsing pairs of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [31] and Carleton et al. [10], we prove that the pair’s members’ search-version complexities are polynomially related (given access, for cases when the winner problem itself is not in polynomial time, to an oracle for the winner problem). Beyond that, we give efficient reductions that from a solution to one compute a solution to the other. For the concrete systems plurality, veto, and approval, we completely determine which of their (due to our results) polynomially-related collapsing search-problem pairs are polynomial-time computable and which are NP-hard.


  • Open Access

    Conceptual Models for Teaching and Learning Computer Science Theory

    by Kimberly Fluet, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Christopher Homan

  • Search Versus Search for Collapsing Electoral Control Types

    by Benjamin Carleton, Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, David E. Narváez, Conor Taliancich, Henry B. Welles


  • Open Access

    Gaps, Ambiguity, and Establishing Complexity-Class Containments via Iterative Constant-Setting

    by Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Mandar Juvekar, Arian Nadjimzadah, Patrick A. Phillips

    Cai and Hemachandra used iterative constant-setting to prove that Few ⊆ ⊕ P (and thus that Few P ⊆ ⊕P). In this article, we note that there is a tension between the nondeterministic ambiguity of the class one is seeking to capture, and the density (or, to be more precise, the needed “nongappiness”) of the easy-to-find “targets” used in iterative constant-setting. In particular, we show that even less restrictive gap-size upper bounds regarding the targets allow one to capture ambiguity-limited classes. Through a flexible, metatheorem-based approach, we do so for a wide range of classes including the logarithmic-ambiguity version of Valiant’s unambiguous nondeterminism class UP. Our work lowers the bar for what advances regarding the existence of infinite, P-printable sets of primes would suffice to show that restricted counting classes based on the primes have the power to accept superconstant-ambiguity analogues of UP. As an application of our work, we prove that the Lenstra–Pomerance–Wagstaff Conjecture implies that all \((\mathcal {O}(1) + \log \log n)\) -ambiguity NP sets are in the restricted counting class RC PRIMES .


  • Open Access

    Separating and Collapsing Electoral Control Types

    by Benjamin Carleton, Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, David E. Narvaez, Conor Taliancich, Henry B. Welles

    Electoral control refers to attacking elections by adding, deleting, or partitioning voters or candidates. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton recently discovered, for seven pairs (T, T′) of seemingly distinct standard electoral control types, that T and T′ are in practice identical: For each input I and each election system E, I is a “yes” instance of both T and T′ under E, or of neither. Surprisingly, this had previously gone undetected even as the field was score-carding how many standard control types various election systems were resistant to; various “different” cells on such score cards were, unknowingly, duplicate effort on the same issue. This naturally raises the worry that perhaps other pairs of control types are identical, and so work still is being needlessly duplicated. We completely determine, for all standard control types, which pairs are, for elections whose votes are linear orderings of the candidates, always identical. In particular, we prove that no identical control pairs exist beyond the known seven. We also for three central election systems completely determine which control pairs are identical (“collapse”) with respect to those particular election systems, and we also explore containment and incomparability relationships between control pairs. For approval voting, which has a different “type” for its votes, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton’s seven collapses still hold (since we observe that their argument applies to all election systems). However, we find 14 additional collapses that hold for approval voting but do not hold for some election systems whose votes are linear orderings of the candidates. We find one new collapse for veto elections and none for plurality. We prove that each of the three election systems mentioned have no collapses other than those inherited from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton or added in the present paper. We establish many new containment relationships between separating control pairs, and for each separating pair of standard control types classify its separation in terms of either containment (always, and strict on some inputs) or incomparability. Our work, for the general case and these three important election systems, clarifies the landscape of the 44 standard control types, for each pair collapsing or separating them, and also providing finer-grained information on the separations.


  • The Complexity of Manipulative Actions in Single-Peaked Societies

    by Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe

  • Open Access

    Search versus Search for Collapsing Electoral Control Types

    by Benjamin Carleton, Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, David E. Narváez, Conor Taliancich, Henry B. Welles

    Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections by altering aspects of their composition and structure [BTT92]. We say two compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the same election system E form a collapsing pair if for every possible input (which typically consists of a candidate set, a vote set, a focus candidate, and sometimes other parameters related to the nature of the attempted alteration), either both or neither of the attempted attacks can be successfully carried out. For each of the seven general (i.e., holding for all election systems) electoral control type collapsing pairs found by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [HHM20] and for each of the additional electoral control type collapsing pairs of Carleton et al. [CCH+ 22] for veto and approval (and many other election systems in light of that paper's Theorems 3.6 and 3.9), both members of the collapsing pair have the same complexity since as sets they are the same set. However, having the same complexity (as sets) is not enough to guarantee that as search problems they have the same complexity. In this paper, we explore the relationships between the search versions of collapsing pairs. For each of the collapsing pairs of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [HHM20] and Carleton et al. [CCH+ 22], we prove that the pair's members' search-version complexities are polynomially related (given access, for cases when the winner problem itself is not in polynomial time, to an oracle for the winner problem). Beyond that, we give efficient reductions that from a solution to one compute a solution to the other. For the concrete systems plurality, veto, and approval, we completely determine which of their (due to our results) polynomially-related collapsing search-problem pairs are polynomial-time computable and which are NP-hard.

  • Open Access

    Separating and Collapsing Electoral Control Types

    by Benjamin Carleton, Michael C. Chavrimootoo, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, David E. Narváez, Conor Taliancich, Henry B. Welles

    [HHM20] discovered, for 7 pairs (C,D) of seemingly distinct standard electoral control types, that C and D are identical: For each input I and each election system, I is a Yes instance of both C and D, or of neither. Surprisingly this had gone undetected, even as the field was score-carding how many std. control types election systems were resistant to; various "different" cells on such score cards were, unknowingly, duplicate effort on the same issue. This naturally raises the worry that other pairs of control types are also identical, and so work still is being needlessly duplicated. We determine, for all std. control types, which pairs are, for elections whose votes are linear orderings of the candidates, always identical. We show that no identical control pairs exist beyond the known 7. We for 3 central election systems determine which control pairs are identical ("collapse") with respect to those systems, and we explore containment/incomparability relationships between control pairs. For approval voting, which has a different "type" for its votes, [HHM20]'s 7 collapses still hold. But we find 14 additional collapses that hold for approval voting but not for some election systems whose votes are linear orderings. We find 1 additional collapse for veto and none for plurality. We prove that each of the 3 election systems mentioned have no collapses other than those inherited from [HHM20] or added here. But we show many new containment relationships that hold between some separating control pairs, and for each separating pair of std. control types classify its separation in terms of containment (always, and strict on some inputs) or incomparability. Our work, for the general case and these 3 important election systems, clarifies the landscape of the 44 std. control types, for each pair collapsing or separating them, and also providing finer-grained information on the separations.