A Secure and Efficient Scheme for Remote Poll Station Voting
- 1 October 2013
- journal article
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing in International Journal of Electronic Government Research
- Vol. 9 (4) , 75-91
Abstract
Electronic voting has found wider acceptance both in developed and developing countries in the recent past. The current research focuses mainly in the area of privacy and security aspects of e-voting. In spite of the good security and privacy features, the existing e-voting protocols remain useful only to small elections or just to support the conventional voting, mainly because of their high computational overhead. Naturally, e-voting is not in wide use, even in the developed countries. Thus, there is a need for e-voting protocols which are secure and practical, but with less complexity. This paper proposes an efficient protocol and framework for the practical implementation of the electronic election process. An analysis on the largest election process in the world shows that the proposed protocol has the potential to serve as an efficient polling system with increased voter turnout. This protocol can be adopted easily in the developed world too.Keywords
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