Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
Open Access
- 7 January 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 65 (2) , 309-333
Abstract
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).Keywords
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (CEX2019-000915-S, PID2020-116771GB-I00)
- Generalitat de Catalunya (2021SGR00194, PID2019-106642GB-I00, ECO2017-83534-P)
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (PID2020-114309GB-I00)
- Generalitat de Catalunya (2021SGR00570, PID2019-106642GB-I00)
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- A unifying impossibility theoremEconomic Theory, 2013
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?Games and Economic Behavior, 2012
- Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theoremSocial Choice and Welfare, 2011
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awardsEconomic Theory, 2006
- Social aggregatorsSocial Choice and Welfare, 2004
- Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approachEconomics Letters, 2001
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare OptimalityReview of Economic Studies, 1999
- Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making1988
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofnessJournal of Economic Theory, 1977
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decisionJournal of Economic Theory, 1969