Antonio Nicolò
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Antonio Nicolò has a total of 77 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jon X. Eguia
5 shared publications- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
ICAE and Departamento Análisis Económico, Facultad CC, Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
4 shared publications - Salvador Barberà
MOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
4 shared publications Aniol Llorente-Saguer
3 shared publicationsArunava Sen
Indian Stat Inst, Econ & Planning Unit, 7 SJS Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India
3 shared publications- Jordi Massó
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
It can't happen here: Democratic Backsliding and the Complacency Trap
We study the interaction of institutions and citizens in a model of democratic backsliding. Greater confidence in institutions' ability to restrain the executive reduces costly vertical restraining. As periods without attempts at backsliding accumulate, institutional confidence increases. This dynamic may generate a complacency trap in which prolonged democratic stability can increase vulnerability to future backsliding. Political heterogeneity and the presence of multiple groups acting as vertical restrainers can further distort the composition of democratic defense and increase the risk of backsliding. Accurate information about institutional restraining capacity and electoral contestability can mitigate the inefficiencies associated with vertical restraining and reduce the risk of backsliding.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIt can't happen here: Democratic Backsliding and the Complacency Trap
We study the interaction of institutions and citizens in a model of democratic backsliding. Greater confidence in institutions' ability to restrain the executive reduces costly vertical restraining. As periods without attempts at backsliding accumulate, institutional confidence increases. This dynamic may generate a complacency trap in which prolonged democratic stability can increase vulnerability to future backsliding. Political heterogeneity and the presence of multiple groups acting as vertical restrainers can further distort the composition of democratic defense and increase the risk of backsliding. Accurate information about institutional restraining capacity and electoral contestability can mitigate the inefficiencies associated with vertical restraining and reduce the risk of backsliding.
- Open Access
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 177
Corruption and extremism
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 177
Open AccessCorruption and extremism
- Open Access
- 7 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 65 (2) , 309-333
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).
- 7 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 65 (2) , 309-333
Open AccessWeak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).
- Open Access
- 5 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 141, 337-363
Stable sharing
- 5 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 141, 337-363
Open AccessStable sharing
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
(Weak) Pairwise Justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call pairwise justifiability,which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access(Weak) Pairwise Justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call pairwise justifiability,which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders.
- 7 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 93-129
Moral Costs of Corruption: A Review of the Literature
- 7 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 93-129
Moral Costs of Corruption: A Review of the Literature
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism: Theory and Evidence
The decline in voters’ trust in government and the rise of populism are two concerning features of contemporary politics. In this paper, we present a model of commitment politics that elucidates the interplay between distrust and populism. Candidates supply policy commitments to mitigate voters’ distrust in government, shrinking politicians’ levels of discretion typical of representative democracies. Alongside commitments, candidates rationally choose the main strategies associated with populism, namely anti-elite and pro-people rhetoric.With novel data on voters’ distrust towards the U.S. federal government, which we match with the Twitter activity of more than 2,000 candidates over five congressional elections, we show that distrust is strongly associated with candidates’ supply of commitments and populist rhetoric, which are also effective strategies at mobilizing distrustful voters. We also show theoretically that the shift to commitment politics determines greater aversion to checks and balances, and hence even illiberal populism can emerge.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism: Theory and Evidence
The decline in voters’ trust in government and the rise of populism are two concerning features of contemporary politics. In this paper, we present a model of commitment politics that elucidates the interplay between distrust and populism. Candidates supply policy commitments to mitigate voters’ distrust in government, shrinking politicians’ levels of discretion typical of representative democracies. Alongside commitments, candidates rationally choose the main strategies associated with populism, namely anti-elite and pro-people rhetoric.With novel data on voters’ distrust towards the U.S. federal government, which we match with the Twitter activity of more than 2,000 candidates over five congressional elections, we show that distrust is strongly associated with candidates’ supply of commitments and populist rhetoric, which are also effective strategies at mobilizing distrustful voters. We also show theoretically that the shift to commitment politics determines greater aversion to checks and balances, and hence even illiberal populism can emerge.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Stable Sharing
We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStable Sharing
We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.
- 8 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (4) , 851-873
Information disclosure with many alternatives
- 8 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (4) , 851-873
Information disclosure with many alternatives