‘Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants
Authors:
- Dirk ForemnyDFDirk Foremny
- Jordi Jofre-MonsenyJJJordi Jofre-Monseny
- Albert Solé-OlléASAlbert Solé-Ollé
- 1 October 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 154, 49-66
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (2014SGR-420)
- Generalitat de Catalunya (ECO2012-37131/ECO2015‐68311‐R, ECO2013-41310/ECO2016-75941-R)
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