Dirk Foremny

Due to technological change, the opening of borders, and increased economic integration, the financial costs of relocating businesses and factors of production, moving residences, changing jobs, and transporting goods and services across borders pose new challenges for countries and subnational governments seeking to implement redistributive policies. This increasing mobility across borders implies that redistributive policies may amplify interjurisdictional fiscal externalities. In this article, we selectively review the literature relating to redistributive policy in an open economy setting. We then consider some of the implications of globalization for policy design, both within federal systems and across countries. Although globalization poses new challenges for fiscal systems, it does not necessarily imply that redistributive policy becomes untenable and possibly enhances the need for redistribution.

This paper analyzes the effect of wealth taxation on mobility and the consequences for tax revenue and wealth inequality. We exploit the unique decentralization of the Spanish wealth tax system in 2011—after which all regions levied positive tax rates except for Madrid—using linked administrative wealth and income tax records. We find that five years after the reform, the stock of wealthy individuals in the region of Madrid increases by 10% relative to other regions, while smaller tax differentials between other regions do not matter for mobility. We rationalize our findings with a theoretical model of evasion and migration, which suggests that evasion is the mechanism most consistent with all of the mobility response being driven by the paraíso fiscal. Combining new subnational wealth inequality series with our estimated elasticities, we show that Madrid’s status as a tax haven reduces the effectiveness of raising tax revenue and exacerbates regional wealth inequalities.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes in a strategic way to maximize reelection prospects. To do so, we exploit the German local business tax as a testing ground which is set autonomously by German municipalities. As election dates vary across local councils, the data allows us to disentangle effects related to the timing of elections from common trends. Using a rich panel data-set for German municipalities, we assess the impact of elections on local business tax choices. The findings support the notion of a political cycle in tax setting behavior as the growth rate of the local business tax is significantly reduced in the election year and the year prior to the election, while it jumps up in the year after the election. This pattern turns out to be robust against a number of sensitivity checks.