This paper examines how Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger conceptualise philosophical grounding through contrasting metaphors – Wittgenstein uses architectural analogies, and Heidegger uses arboreal ones – and how these metaphors frame the metaphysical enterprise. Wittgenstein critiques foundational metaphysical propositions (e.g., “The Nothing noths”) as ornamental gestures devoid of inferential function, akin to decorative frames that highlight the beginning of inquiry without structurally supporting it. Drawing on Adolf Loos’s distinction between style and ornament, he treats such utterances as stylistically contingent rather than logically necessary. Heidegger, by contrast, roots metaphysical grounding in an organic, living system: metaphysics is the root that draws nourishment from Being as soil, with the ground being simultaneously inside and outside the structure it sustains. While both thinkers acknowledge the inarticulability of philosophical ground, Heidegger embraces its ambiguity as essential, whereas Wittgenstein views it as a grammatical confusion. The final sections consider poetic and epigraphic elements as forms of textual ornamentation that gesture towards the ungrounded ground of philosophy; both Wittgenstein and Heidegger locate the grounding limits of reason in lived experience. This reading proposes that ornament is not extrinsic but constitutive of how philosophy frames its beginning – stylistically, conceptually, and metaphysically.