Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare
- 27 October 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1204-1223
Abstract
Abstract. Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41Keywords
All Related Versions
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