Lynne Pepall
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lynne Pepall has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- George Norman
Tufts University
6 shared publications - Daniel Richards
Tufts University
5 shared publications Joseph Reiff
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1 shared publication- Karen Eggleston
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 59 (3) , 443-459
Targeted Value-Enhancing Advertising and Price Competition
Digital markets provide firms with vast amounts of consumer data. Economists who have explored this phenomenon have focused on how firms use data to implement price discrimination. Targeted advertising in this context transmits different price information to different consumers. However, advertising is itself often valued by consumers, and can be viewed as a complement to the advertised product. Such advertising may also be customized and targeted. We investigate how targeted value-enhancing advertising affects competition. Competing for consumers with targeted advertising leads overall to higher prices and increases consumer surplus but reduces profitability. In certain markets the advertising is inefficiently over-supplied.
- 6 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 59 (3) , 443-459
Open AccessTargeted Value-Enhancing Advertising and Price Competition
Digital markets provide firms with vast amounts of consumer data. Economists who have explored this phenomenon have focused on how firms use data to implement price discrimination. Targeted advertising in this context transmits different price information to different consumers. However, advertising is itself often valued by consumers, and can be viewed as a complement to the advertised product. Such advertising may also be customized and targeted. We investigate how targeted value-enhancing advertising affects competition. Competing for consumers with targeted advertising leads overall to higher prices and increases consumer surplus but reduces profitability. In certain markets the advertising is inefficiently over-supplied.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 51 (3) , 235-256
Targeted Advertising and Cumulative Exposure Effects: The Impact of Banning Advertising to Children in Quebec
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 51 (3) , 235-256
Targeted Advertising and Cumulative Exposure Effects: The Impact of Banning Advertising to Children in Quebec
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 48 (3) , 289-306
Sequential Product Innovation, Competition and Patent Policy
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 48 (3) , 289-306
Sequential Product Innovation, Competition and Patent Policy
- 10 September 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 8 (1)
Entrepreneurial First Movers, Brand-Name Fast Seconds, and the Evolution of Market Structure
We analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs who open new markets and established, `fast second' firms to develop them. We use a spatially differentiated model in which early entry is traditionally excessive. However, the anticipated later entry by the `fast second' brand can potentially reverse this result. We show that conditions that make for the most initial competitive market are precisely those that result in the least optimal amount of initial entry and in which entrepreneurial entry is typically well below the efficient level. We also show that asymmetric oligopoly is a natural market equilibrium.
- 10 September 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 8 (1)
Entrepreneurial First Movers, Brand-Name Fast Seconds, and the Evolution of Market Structure
We analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs who open new markets and established, `fast second' firms to develop them. We use a spatially differentiated model in which early entry is traditionally excessive. However, the anticipated later entry by the `fast second' brand can potentially reverse this result. We show that conditions that make for the most initial competitive market are precisely those that result in the least optimal amount of initial entry and in which entrepreneurial entry is typically well below the efficient level. We also show that asymmetric oligopoly is a natural market equilibrium.
- 27 October 2005
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1204-1223
Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare
Abstract. Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41
- 27 October 2005
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1204-1223
Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare
Abstract. Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-29
Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
The rise of managed healthcare organizations (MCOs) and the associated increased integration among providers has transformed US healthcare and at the same time raised antitrust concern. This paper examines how competition among MCOs affects the efficiency gains of improved price coordination achieved through integration. MCOs offer differentiated services and contract with specialized and complementary upstream providers to supply these services. We identify strategic pricing equilibria under three different market structures: overlapping upstream physician-hospital alliances, upstream-downstream arrangements such as Preferred Provider Organizations, and vertically integrated Health Maintenance Organizations. The efficiency gains achieved depend not only on organizational form but also on the toughness of premium competition. We show that, contrary to popular thinking, providers and insurers do not earn maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate level of market power. Furthermore, closer integration of upstream and downstream providers does not necessarily increase net revenues.
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-29
Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
The rise of managed healthcare organizations (MCOs) and the associated increased integration among providers has transformed US healthcare and at the same time raised antitrust concern. This paper examines how competition among MCOs affects the efficiency gains of improved price coordination achieved through integration. MCOs offer differentiated services and contract with specialized and complementary upstream providers to supply these services. We identify strategic pricing equilibria under three different market structures: overlapping upstream physician-hospital alliances, upstream-downstream arrangements such as Preferred Provider Organizations, and vertically integrated Health Maintenance Organizations. The efficiency gains achieved depend not only on organizational form but also on the toughness of premium competition. We show that, contrary to popular thinking, providers and insurers do not earn maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate level of market power. Furthermore, closer integration of upstream and downstream providers does not necessarily increase net revenues.
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 10 (2) , 201-233
Product Differentiation and Upstream-Downstream Relations
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 10 (2) , 201-233
Product Differentiation and Upstream-Downstream Relations
- 1 January 2000
- Published by JSTOR in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 66 (3) , 667
Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition
- 1 January 2000
- Published by JSTOR in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 66 (3) , 667
Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition
- 1 January 1994
- Published by JSTOR in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 60 (3) , 673
Innovation, Imitation, and Social Welfare
- 1 January 1994
- Published by JSTOR in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 60 (3) , 673
Innovation, Imitation, and Social Welfare