Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
- 25 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 19 (1) , 25-53
Abstract
We demonstrate the value of “equal pay” policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.Keywords
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