Debashis Pal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Debashis Pal has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arup Bose
Indian Statistical Institute 203 B. T. Road Kolkata 700108, India
2 shared publications - Barnali Gupta
Department of Economics, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056, USA
1 shared publication - David E. M. Sappington
Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
1 shared publication David E.M. Sappington
1 shared publication- Jyotirmoy Sarkar
Department of Mathematical Sciences Indiana University Purdue University at Indianapolis Indianapolis IN 46202 USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 June 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 107 (3) , 330-332
On the design of piece-rate contracts
- 30 June 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 107 (3) , 330-332
On the design of piece-rate contracts
- 25 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 19 (1) , 25-53
Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
We demonstrate the value of “equal pay” policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.
- 25 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 19 (1) , 25-53
Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
We demonstrate the value of “equal pay” policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by JSTOR in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 29 (2)
A Geometric Solution of a Cournot Oligopoly with Nonidentical Firms
- 1 January 1998
- Published by JSTOR in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 29 (2)
A Geometric Solution of a Cournot Oligopoly with Nonidentical Firms