Own or Other Integrity in Expected Moral Judgments? Moral Pluralism and Political Partisanship
Open Access
- 28 September 2025
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 17 (5) , 605-615
Abstract
We examine whether people believe they should be judged in ways consistent with their own moral values, or with those of their judge. Drawing on the differing moral priorities of Democrats and Republicans, in two studies, we compare the own-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with one’s own moral standards, based on the universality of morality) and the other-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with the out-group’s standards, based on aversion to moral hypocrisy). Our findings support the other-integrity hypothesis : Republicans believed that Democrats should judge them more harshly for violations of individualizing moralities (which Democrats prioritize), while Democrats believed that Republicans should judge them more harshly for violations of binding moralities (which Republicans prioritize); Democrats and Republicans showed greater confidence predicting future judgments by an out-group judge whose previous judgments aligned with the judge’s group moral priorities, rather than the participant’s group, while considering both judges equally moral.Keywords
Funding Information
- Israel Science Foundation (604/20)
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