Adi Amit
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Adi Amit has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Eitan Venzhik
The Open University of Israel, Israel
3 shared publications- Sari Mentser
Department of Education and Psychology, The Open University of Israel, Raanana, Israel
3 shared publications Lilach Sagiv
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
2 shared publicationsSari Mentser
Open Univ Israel, Raanana, Israel
2 shared publicationsSharon Arieli
Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Jerusalem Sch Business Adm, Jerusalem, Israel
2 shared publications- Arik Cheshin
Department of Human Services, University of Haifa
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 March 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 18 (1) , 49-59
The Enduring Effect of Exposure to Moral Exemplars During Active Intergroup Tensions: Evidence From Groups Within Israel
Learning about outgroup individuals who risked their lives to save members of one’s ingroup can improve intergroup relations. However, previous studies have primarily focused on historical conflicts with clear intergroup boundaries, relied solely on self-report measures, and lacked assessments of durable effects. A preregistered preliminary experiment and a preregistered main experiment tested whether exposure to moral exemplars would improve the attitudes of Jewish citizens of Israel toward Arab citizens of Israel (their outgroup) following the October 7 attacks. Jewish Israeli participants who read true stories of outgroup (vs. ingroup) heroic acts showed more positive outgroup evaluation and reduced ingroup favoritism. In the main experiment, these effects persisted 1 week later and were accompanied by an effect on an indirect measure (Single-Target IAT) of outgroup morality immediately following the intervention. The results support the effectiveness and durability of the moral exemplar approach in improving outgroup evaluations.
- 9 March 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 18 (1) , 49-59
Open AccessThe Enduring Effect of Exposure to Moral Exemplars During Active Intergroup Tensions: Evidence From Groups Within Israel
Learning about outgroup individuals who risked their lives to save members of one’s ingroup can improve intergroup relations. However, previous studies have primarily focused on historical conflicts with clear intergroup boundaries, relied solely on self-report measures, and lacked assessments of durable effects. A preregistered preliminary experiment and a preregistered main experiment tested whether exposure to moral exemplars would improve the attitudes of Jewish citizens of Israel toward Arab citizens of Israel (their outgroup) following the October 7 attacks. Jewish Israeli participants who read true stories of outgroup (vs. ingroup) heroic acts showed more positive outgroup evaluation and reduced ingroup favoritism. In the main experiment, these effects persisted 1 week later and were accompanied by an effect on an indirect measure (Single-Target IAT) of outgroup morality immediately following the intervention. The results support the effectiveness and durability of the moral exemplar approach in improving outgroup evaluations.
- Open Access
- 28 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 17 (5) , 605-615
Own or Other Integrity in Expected Moral Judgments? Moral Pluralism and Political Partisanship
We examine whether people believe they should be judged in ways consistent with their own moral values, or with those of their judge. Drawing on the differing moral priorities of Democrats and Republicans, in two studies, we compare the own-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with one’s own moral standards, based on the universality of morality) and the other-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with the out-group’s standards, based on aversion to moral hypocrisy). Our findings support the other-integrity hypothesis : Republicans believed that Democrats should judge them more harshly for violations of individualizing moralities (which Democrats prioritize), while Democrats believed that Republicans should judge them more harshly for violations of binding moralities (which Republicans prioritize); Democrats and Republicans showed greater confidence predicting future judgments by an out-group judge whose previous judgments aligned with the judge’s group moral priorities, rather than the participant’s group, while considering both judges equally moral.
- 28 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 17 (5) , 605-615
Open AccessOwn or Other Integrity in Expected Moral Judgments? Moral Pluralism and Political Partisanship
We examine whether people believe they should be judged in ways consistent with their own moral values, or with those of their judge. Drawing on the differing moral priorities of Democrats and Republicans, in two studies, we compare the own-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with one’s own moral standards, based on the universality of morality) and the other-integrity hypothesis (believing judgments should align with the out-group’s standards, based on aversion to moral hypocrisy). Our findings support the other-integrity hypothesis : Republicans believed that Democrats should judge them more harshly for violations of individualizing moralities (which Democrats prioritize), while Democrats believed that Republicans should judge them more harshly for violations of binding moralities (which Republicans prioritize); Democrats and Republicans showed greater confidence predicting future judgments by an out-group judge whose previous judgments aligned with the judge’s group moral priorities, rather than the participant’s group, while considering both judges equally moral.
- Open Access
- 5 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 64 (3) , e12897
The role of perceived self‐transcendence values in forming functional relationships with professionals
Existing research into values and relationship formation highlights the role of individuals' own values or value similarity between the parties. We consider the formation of functional relationships with professionals, which cannot be fully explained by documented value‐based mechanisms. Instead, we examine the role of professionals' values as perceived by others. We study two occupations that require forming relationships yet are characterized by opposing value profiles: therapists and managers, who are prototypically high in self‐transcendence and self‐enhancement values, respectively. We show that: (a) client–therapist and employee–manager relationships are stronger the more the professional is perceived as prioritizing self‐transcendence (Study 1, N = 191, USA); (b) perceived self‐transcendence of managers contributes to relationship quality beyond employee personal values and employee–manager value similarity (Study 2, N = 177, IL); and (c) perceptions of warmth mediate the link between perceived self‐transcendence and relationship formation (Study 3, N = 297, USA). Our discussion further highlights the importance of perceived values.
- 5 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 64 (3) , e12897
Open AccessThe role of perceived self‐transcendence values in forming functional relationships with professionals
Existing research into values and relationship formation highlights the role of individuals' own values or value similarity between the parties. We consider the formation of functional relationships with professionals, which cannot be fully explained by documented value‐based mechanisms. Instead, we examine the role of professionals' values as perceived by others. We study two occupations that require forming relationships yet are characterized by opposing value profiles: therapists and managers, who are prototypically high in self‐transcendence and self‐enhancement values, respectively. We show that: (a) client–therapist and employee–manager relationships are stronger the more the professional is perceived as prioritizing self‐transcendence (Study 1, N = 191, USA); (b) perceived self‐transcendence of managers contributes to relationship quality beyond employee personal values and employee–manager value similarity (Study 2, N = 177, IL); and (c) perceptions of warmth mediate the link between perceived self‐transcendence and relationship formation (Study 3, N = 297, USA). Our discussion further highlights the importance of perceived values.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Vol. 28 (2) , 237-255
Judgments toward displays of national (dis)loyalty in members of nations other than one’s own: Universalistic and parochial perspectives
National loyalty is viewed as a moral value and a crucial manifestation of national identification. Yet few studies have investigated how people judge (dis)loyalty among members of other (i.e., outgroup) nations. Investigating such judgments helps tease apart two ways of viewing loyalty—through a parochial or universalistic lens. We investigate symbolic expressions of (dis)loyalty within the context of US–China tensions (Study 1, N = 603 and N = 111), and concrete acts of (dis)loyalty within the context of Israel–Iran tensions (Study 2, N = 300; Study 3, N = 217). We expose differential judgments toward members of one’s own nation versus other nations, reflecting a parochial view of loyalty, which is strengthened by conservation values. At the same time, we show that loyalty is valued even in members of adversary nations, expressing a universalistic view of loyalty, especially when the interests of the ingroup are not involved.
- 17 September 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Vol. 28 (2) , 237-255
Open AccessJudgments toward displays of national (dis)loyalty in members of nations other than one’s own: Universalistic and parochial perspectives
National loyalty is viewed as a moral value and a crucial manifestation of national identification. Yet few studies have investigated how people judge (dis)loyalty among members of other (i.e., outgroup) nations. Investigating such judgments helps tease apart two ways of viewing loyalty—through a parochial or universalistic lens. We investigate symbolic expressions of (dis)loyalty within the context of US–China tensions (Study 1, N = 603 and N = 111), and concrete acts of (dis)loyalty within the context of Israel–Iran tensions (Study 2, N = 300; Study 3, N = 217). We expose differential judgments toward members of one’s own nation versus other nations, reflecting a parochial view of loyalty, which is strengthened by conservation values. At the same time, we show that loyalty is valued even in members of adversary nations, expressing a universalistic view of loyalty, especially when the interests of the ingroup are not involved.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 51 (12) , 2571-2585
Morality, Social Inclusion, and In-Group Superiority: The Differential Role of Individualizing and Binding Foundations in Perceptions of the Social Identity of In-Group and Out-Group Members
Research into social identity and morality judgments typically focuses on how the former influences the latter. We approach this theme from the opposite direction, establishing the influence of morality on perceptions of social identity. In three studies, conducted in two cultures, we show that in-group members acting immorally are excluded from the group. Extending this investigation to the overlooked study of out-group-on-out-group behavior, in Studies 2 and 3, we compare perceptions of social inclusion for in-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the in-group with perceptions of out-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the out-group. We show that people treat in-group and out-group members alike with respect to binding morals, which concern preservation and protection of the group, but not individualizing morals, which concern preservation and protection of individual rights. Finally, in Study 3, we confirm the underlying motivating mechanism of reasserting in-group superiority by affirming the positive distinctiveness of one’s own group.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 51 (12) , 2571-2585
Open AccessMorality, Social Inclusion, and In-Group Superiority: The Differential Role of Individualizing and Binding Foundations in Perceptions of the Social Identity of In-Group and Out-Group Members
Research into social identity and morality judgments typically focuses on how the former influences the latter. We approach this theme from the opposite direction, establishing the influence of morality on perceptions of social identity. In three studies, conducted in two cultures, we show that in-group members acting immorally are excluded from the group. Extending this investigation to the overlooked study of out-group-on-out-group behavior, in Studies 2 and 3, we compare perceptions of social inclusion for in-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the in-group with perceptions of out-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the out-group. We show that people treat in-group and out-group members alike with respect to binding morals, which concern preservation and protection of the group, but not individualizing morals, which concern preservation and protection of individual rights. Finally, in Study 3, we confirm the underlying motivating mechanism of reasserting in-group superiority by affirming the positive distinctiveness of one’s own group.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (2) , 513-528
The added value of perceived values: Partner's perceived values predict own behaviour in interdependent interactions
Personal values have been widely recognized as important determinants of individuals’ behaviour. But can behaviour be shaped by the values one attributes to others? Focusing on interdependent interactions, this research integrates literature on personal values and the role of expectations in social dilemmas to investigate the overlooked effect of value perceptions on people's choices. In Study 1, players in a prisoner's dilemma (a game capturing cooperation vs. competition) who were informed that their partner prioritized self‐transcendence values tended to cooperate more than players informed that the partner prioritized self‐enhancement values. In Study 2, players in the same game who assumed their partner was higher in self‐transcendence values and lower in self‐enhancement values were more likely to opt for the cooperative choice. In Study 3, players in a chicken game (a game capturing risk‐taking vs. risk‐avoidance) who assumed their partner was higher in conservation values and lower in openness‐to‐change values were more likely to opt for the riskier choice in the game. Study 4 indicated that the effect of perceived values on behaviour is mediated by assumptions regarding the partner's choice. Perceived values of the other side predicted behaviour beyond the perceiver's own values. We discuss the relationships between own and perceived values and our contributions to the values literature and conflict research.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (2) , 513-528
Open AccessThe added value of perceived values: Partner's perceived values predict own behaviour in interdependent interactions
Personal values have been widely recognized as important determinants of individuals’ behaviour. But can behaviour be shaped by the values one attributes to others? Focusing on interdependent interactions, this research integrates literature on personal values and the role of expectations in social dilemmas to investigate the overlooked effect of value perceptions on people's choices. In Study 1, players in a prisoner's dilemma (a game capturing cooperation vs. competition) who were informed that their partner prioritized self‐transcendence values tended to cooperate more than players informed that the partner prioritized self‐enhancement values. In Study 2, players in the same game who assumed their partner was higher in self‐transcendence values and lower in self‐enhancement values were more likely to opt for the cooperative choice. In Study 3, players in a chicken game (a game capturing risk‐taking vs. risk‐avoidance) who assumed their partner was higher in conservation values and lower in openness‐to‐change values were more likely to opt for the riskier choice in the game. Study 4 indicated that the effect of perceived values on behaviour is mediated by assumptions regarding the partner's choice. Perceived values of the other side predicted behaviour beyond the perceiver's own values. We discuss the relationships between own and perceived values and our contributions to the values literature and conflict research.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The added value of perceived values: Partner’s perceived values predict own behavior in interdependent interactions
Personal values have been widely recognized as important determinants of individuals’ behavior. But can behavior be shaped by the values one attributes to others? Focusing on interdependent interactions, this research integrates literature on personal values and the role of expectations in social dilemmas to investigate the overlooked effect of value perceptions on people’s choices. In Study 1, players in a prisoner’s dilemma (a game capturing cooperation vs. competition) who were informed that their partner prioritized self-transcendence values tended to cooperate more than players informed that the partner prioritized self-enhancement values. In Study 2, players in the same game who assumed their partner was higher in self-transcendence values and lower in self-enhancement values were more likely to opt for the cooperative choice. In Study 3, players in a chicken game (a game capturing risk-taking vs. risk-avoidance) who assumed their partner was higher in conservation values and lower in openness-to-change values were more likely to opt for the riskier choice in the game. Study 4 indicated that the effect of perceived values on behavior is mediated by assumptions regarding the partner’s choice. Perceived values of the other side predicted behavior beyond the perceiver’s own values. We discuss the relationships between own and perceived values and our contributions to the values literature and conflict research.
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe added value of perceived values: Partner’s perceived values predict own behavior in interdependent interactions
Personal values have been widely recognized as important determinants of individuals’ behavior. But can behavior be shaped by the values one attributes to others? Focusing on interdependent interactions, this research integrates literature on personal values and the role of expectations in social dilemmas to investigate the overlooked effect of value perceptions on people’s choices. In Study 1, players in a prisoner’s dilemma (a game capturing cooperation vs. competition) who were informed that their partner prioritized self-transcendence values tended to cooperate more than players informed that the partner prioritized self-enhancement values. In Study 2, players in the same game who assumed their partner was higher in self-transcendence values and lower in self-enhancement values were more likely to opt for the cooperative choice. In Study 3, players in a chicken game (a game capturing risk-taking vs. risk-avoidance) who assumed their partner was higher in conservation values and lower in openness-to-change values were more likely to opt for the riskier choice in the game. Study 4 indicated that the effect of perceived values on behavior is mediated by assumptions regarding the partner’s choice. Perceived values of the other side predicted behavior beyond the perceiver’s own values. We discuss the relationships between own and perceived values and our contributions to the values literature and conflict research.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1653-1671
Inclusive and exclusive beneficiary attributions: The role of social identity complexity in interpretations of and punishment for dissent
We suggest that intentionality attributed to dissenting behavior in intergroup contexts (e.g., exposing one’s country’s secrets) may be conceptualized as benefitting one of four social circles. Two social circles exclude the perceiver: (a) the actor him/herself and (b) the outgroup affected by the behavior; and two circles include the perceiver: (c) the ingroup of both the perceiver and the actor and (d) humanity as the ultimate collective including both ingroup and outgroup. We further suggest that adopting different beneficiary attributions depends on the perceivers’ social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), which refers to an individual’s representation of their multiple social identities on a continuum from highly overlapping to highly differentiated (i.e., simple vs. complex social identity). Perceivers are more likely to attribute dissent behavior to social circles that exclude (rather than include) themselves the simpler their social identity; such exclusive attributions lead to harsher moral judgements, expressed as punitiveness.
- 15 July 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1653-1671
Open AccessInclusive and exclusive beneficiary attributions: The role of social identity complexity in interpretations of and punishment for dissent
We suggest that intentionality attributed to dissenting behavior in intergroup contexts (e.g., exposing one’s country’s secrets) may be conceptualized as benefitting one of four social circles. Two social circles exclude the perceiver: (a) the actor him/herself and (b) the outgroup affected by the behavior; and two circles include the perceiver: (c) the ingroup of both the perceiver and the actor and (d) humanity as the ultimate collective including both ingroup and outgroup. We further suggest that adopting different beneficiary attributions depends on the perceivers’ social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), which refers to an individual’s representation of their multiple social identities on a continuum from highly overlapping to highly differentiated (i.e., simple vs. complex social identity). Perceivers are more likely to attribute dissent behavior to social circles that exclude (rather than include) themselves the simpler their social identity; such exclusive attributions lead to harsher moral judgements, expressed as punitiveness.
- 1 March 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 120 (3) , 765-788
Distinguishing deliberate from systematic thinking.
Deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are often conflated when contrasted with intuitive thinking. We argue that, in fact, nonintuitive thinking is multidimensional, and that deliberate and systematic thinking are distinct nonintuitive processes. We establish their distinct meanings in 6 studies using 3 research paradigms. Our first paradigm (Studies 1 and 2) takes an individual differences approach. Adopting a meta-analytic design with the addition of new data, we find that deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are differentially associated with personality traits (openness to experience with deliberate thinking; conscientiousness with systematic thinking) and with personal values (self-direction vs. conformity with deliberate thinking; security vs. stimulation with systematic thinking). Our second paradigm (Studies 3 and 4) employs a decision-making task (choosing between different problem types and levels of difficulty) to test for deliberate and systematic thinking in isolation from each other. We show that systematic thinking (in oneself and others) predicts a selection of rule-based over context-based problems, while deliberate thinking predicts a selection of difficult over simple problems. Our third paradigm (Studies 5 and 6) takes a cultural perspective. We show that although deliberate thinking is universally perceived as signifying competence, the contribution of systematic thinking to perceptions of competence is culturally dependent, differing for participants under a collectivistic versus individualistic mindset. Together our findings highlight the need to distinguish between deliberate and systematic thinking and underscore the need for studies of intuitive versus nonintuitive thinking to take a multidimensional perspective.
- 1 March 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 120 (3) , 765-788
Distinguishing deliberate from systematic thinking.
Deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are often conflated when contrasted with intuitive thinking. We argue that, in fact, nonintuitive thinking is multidimensional, and that deliberate and systematic thinking are distinct nonintuitive processes. We establish their distinct meanings in 6 studies using 3 research paradigms. Our first paradigm (Studies 1 and 2) takes an individual differences approach. Adopting a meta-analytic design with the addition of new data, we find that deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are differentially associated with personality traits (openness to experience with deliberate thinking; conscientiousness with systematic thinking) and with personal values (self-direction vs. conformity with deliberate thinking; security vs. stimulation with systematic thinking). Our second paradigm (Studies 3 and 4) employs a decision-making task (choosing between different problem types and levels of difficulty) to test for deliberate and systematic thinking in isolation from each other. We show that systematic thinking (in oneself and others) predicts a selection of rule-based over context-based problems, while deliberate thinking predicts a selection of difficult over simple problems. Our third paradigm (Studies 5 and 6) takes a cultural perspective. We show that although deliberate thinking is universally perceived as signifying competence, the contribution of systematic thinking to perceptions of competence is culturally dependent, differing for participants under a collectivistic versus individualistic mindset. Together our findings highlight the need to distinguish between deliberate and systematic thinking and underscore the need for studies of intuitive versus nonintuitive thinking to take a multidimensional perspective.