Be careful what you wish for: Portfolio allocation, presidential popularity, and electoral payoffs to parties in multiparty presidentialism

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Abstract
We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism’s heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president’s cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president.
Funding Information
  • CNPq – National Coucil for Scientific and Technologic Development (PQ303013/2021-4)
  • Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel - Capes/PrInt (88887.312041/2018-00)

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