How do signaling and reputation function as critical clues to e-commerce platform governance? Evidence from Chinese rice transaction data
- 24 February 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Electronic Commerce Research
- Vol. 25 (5) , 3637-3661
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- the Postgraduate Research & Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province (KYCX22_1682)
- the Special Research Projects for Doctoral Talents, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics (BSZX2022-02)
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