The only Dance in Town: Unique Equilibrium in a Generalized Model of Price Competition*
Open Access
- 1 September 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 69 (3) , 595-614
Abstract
We study a model of simultaneous price competition that subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. Firms sell a homogeneous good to consumers characterized by the number of prices they (exogenously) consider. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if some consumers consider exactly two prices. The equilibrium is in symmetric mixed strategies. When no consumer considers exactly two prices, there is, in addition, an uncountable infinity of asymmetric equilibria. Our results show that the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium, and only the commonly sought symmetric equilibrium is robust to perturbations in consumer behavior.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
- The informational divideGames and Economic Behavior, 2013
- Consumer Protection and the Incentive to Become InformedJournal of the European Economic Association, 2009
- Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2009
- Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects2007
- Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product MarketsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- The possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria with constant-returns-to-scale technology under Bertrand competitionSpanish Economic Review, 2000
- The all-pay auction with complete informationEconomic Theory, 1996
- Competitive Promotional StrategiesThe Journal of Business, 1988
- Equilibrium Price DispersionEconometrica, 1983
- A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher PriceEconometrica, 1980