David Ronayne
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David Ronayne has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Antoine Dubus
Department of Management, Technology and Economics ETH Zürich Leonhardstrasse 21 - 8092 Switzerland
2 shared publications - Daniel Sgroi
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2 shared publications - Hemant K. Bhargava
Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, California 95616; and Center for Analytics and Technology in Society, University of California, Davis, California 95616
2 shared publications Anthony Tuckwell
1 shared publication- Benjamin Ferguson
University of Warwick
1 shared publication - David P. Myatt
London Business School
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 264
Decreasing returns to sampling without replacement
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 264
Open AccessDecreasing returns to sampling without replacement
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1472-1488
The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1472-1488
Top Cited PapersThe Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
- Open Access
The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.
Open AccessThe Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2022
- Published by American Economic Association
How Do Philosophers Understand Exploitation?
- 8 May 2022
- Published by American Economic Association
Open AccessHow Do Philosophers Understand Exploitation?
- Open Access
- 16 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (642) , 741-766
Competing Sales Channels with Captive Consumers
We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.
- 16 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (642) , 741-766
Open AccessCompeting Sales Channels with Captive Consumers
We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 69 (3) , 595-614
The only Dance in Town: Unique Equilibrium in a Generalized Model of Price Competition*
We study a model of simultaneous price competition that subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. Firms sell a homogeneous good to consumers characterized by the number of prices they (exogenously) consider. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if some consumers consider exactly two prices. The equilibrium is in symmetric mixed strategies. When no consumer considers exactly two prices, there is, in addition, an uncountable infinity of asymmetric equilibria. Our results show that the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium, and only the commonly sought symmetric equilibrium is robust to perturbations in consumer behavior.
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 69 (3) , 595-614
Open AccessThe only Dance in Town: Unique Equilibrium in a Generalized Model of Price Competition*
We study a model of simultaneous price competition that subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. Firms sell a homogeneous good to consumers characterized by the number of prices they (exogenously) consider. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if some consumers consider exactly two prices. The equilibrium is in symmetric mixed strategies. When no consumer considers exactly two prices, there is, in addition, an uncountable infinity of asymmetric equilibria. Our results show that the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium, and only the commonly sought symmetric equilibrium is robust to perturbations in consumer behavior.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 186, 318-327
Evaluating the sunk cost effect
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 186, 318-327
Evaluating the sunk cost effect
- Open Access
- 31 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 62 (3) , 1081-1110
PRICE COMPARISON WEBSITES
The large and growing industry of price comparison websites (PCWs) or “web aggregators” is poised to benefit consumers by increasing competitive pricing pressure on firms by acquainting shoppers with more prices. However, these sites also charge firms for sales, which feeds back to raise prices. I find that introducing any number of PCWs to a market increases prices for all consumers, both those who use the sites and those who do not. I then use my framework to identify ways in which a more competitive environment could be achieved.
- 31 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 62 (3) , 1081-1110
Open AccessPRICE COMPARISON WEBSITES
The large and growing industry of price comparison websites (PCWs) or “web aggregators” is poised to benefit consumers by increasing competitive pricing pressure on firms by acquainting shoppers with more prices. However, these sites also charge firms for sales, which feeds back to raise prices. I find that introducing any number of PCWs to a market increases prices for all consumers, both those who use the sites and those who do not. I then use my framework to identify ways in which a more competitive environment could be achieved.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (3-4) , 389-403
Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition
- 23 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (3-4) , 389-403
Open AccessExtreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition
- Open Access
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 81, 11-27
Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An account of the attraction, compromise and similarity effects
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 81, 11-27
Open AccessMulti-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An account of the attraction, compromise and similarity effects