Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment
- 23 January 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 81 (3) , 633-652
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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