Beth A. Freeborn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Beth A. Freeborn has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lisa R. Anderson
College of William and Mary
3 shared publications - Andrea Golden1 shared publication
- Andrew Turscak
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, USA
1 shared publication - Brett W. Wendling
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Washington, USA
1 shared publication - Charles A. Holt
University of Virginia
1 shared publication - Jason P. Hulbert
University of Maryland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 66 (2) , 161-188
Pay every subject or pay only some?
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 66 (2) , 161-188
Pay every subject or pay only some?
- Open Access
An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity rule than under majority rule. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with sequential and simultaneous voting under unanimity and majority rule. Observed behavior varies significantly depending on whether juries vote simultaneously or in sequence. We also find evidence that subjects use information inferred from prior votes in making their sequential voting decisions, but that information implied by being pivotal in simultaneous votes does not seem to be reliably processed.
Open AccessAn Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity rule than under majority rule. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with sequential and simultaneous voting under unanimity and majority rule. Observed behavior varies significantly depending on whether juries vote simultaneously or in sequence. We also find evidence that subjects use information inferred from prior votes in making their sequential voting decisions, but that information implied by being pivotal in simultaneous votes does not seem to be reliably processed.
- 23 January 2015
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 81 (3) , 633-652
Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment
- 23 January 2015
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 81 (3) , 633-652
Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment
- 22 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 43 (4) , 303-326
Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents, and Accuracy of Credit Reporting
- 22 November 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 43 (4) , 303-326
Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents, and Accuracy of Credit Reporting
- 9 October 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Consumer Affairs
- Vol. 47 (3) , 588-601
Accuracy of Information Maintained by US Credit Bureaus: Frequency of Errors and Effects on Consumers' Credit Scores
- 9 October 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Consumer Affairs
- Vol. 47 (3) , 588-601
Accuracy of Information Maintained by US Credit Bureaus: Frequency of Errors and Effects on Consumers' Credit Scores
- 4 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 40 (1) , 37-50
Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment
- 4 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 40 (1) , 37-50
Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment