Capital diversion in Vietnamese state-owned enterprises
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Abstract
We consider the capital productivity of a panel data set of 10,200 Vietnam state-owned enterprises over the period 2010-2018, using a stochastic frontier production modelling. We discover there exists an overutilization of the physical capital and more importantly, diversion of the capital stock. This diversion may be due to a waste of capital stocks or to a special form of bribery we call "hidden overhead". The very high diversion rate, 69% on average, calls for a profound reform of the sector.Keywords
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