Protection, lobbying, and market structure
Authors:
- Arye L. HillmanAHArye L. Hillman
- Ngo Van LongNLNgo Van Long
- Antoine SoubeyranASAntoine Soubeyran
- 1 August 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 54 (2) , 383-409
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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