CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts
Authors:
- Shivaram RajgopalSRShivaram Rajgopal
- Terry ShevlinTSTerry Shevlin
- Valentina ZamoraVZValentina Zamora
- 3 August 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1813-1844
Abstract
Although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market‐wide effects (i.e., RPE), there is little evidence to support this theory. Oyer (2004, Journal of Finance 59, 1619–1649) posits that an absence of RPE is optimal if the CEO's reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. We directly test and find support for Oyer's (2004) theory. We argue that the CEO's outside opportunities depend on his talent, as proxied by the CEO's financial press visibility and his firm's industry‐adjusted ROA. Our results are robust to alternate explanations such as managerial skimming, oligopoly, and asymmetric benchmarking.Keywords
This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
- Executive Compensation as an Agency ProblemJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2003
- Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive CompensationThe University of Chicago Law Review, 2002
- Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals AreThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
- An examination of executive stock option repricingJournal of Financial Economics, 2001
- On the optimality of resetting executive stock optionsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and EvidenceThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive CompensationJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOsJournal of Labor Economics, 1990
- An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate ExecutivesJournal of Accounting Research, 1986
- Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control SystemsJournal of Accounting Research, 1980