What is the Idea of the Soul? Comments on Katharina Kraus, Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation
Open Access
- 28 June 2022
- journal article
- review article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 27 (3) , 475-481
Abstract
These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense.Keywords
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