Patrick Frierson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Patrick Frierson has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laura Desirée Di Paolo
Department of Engineering and Informatics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (5) , 1-30
Montessori, math, and materials: a case of extended cognition
In this article, we bring Maria Montessori’s pedagogy into conversation with contemporary developments in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. In particular, we seek to show that Montessori’s “prepared environment” provides a context within which cognitive tasks are performed in the interfaces and interactions among brains, bodies, and concrete mathematical materials. For ease of illustration, we will focus on one particular Montessori material—the “Stamp Game,” used by children of approximately ages 4–7 for ordinary arithmetic. In both cases, our goal is, first, to show the way in which this particular material can be enmeshed with a particular child’s brain and body in order to become capable of complex mathematical operations. In that sense, we argue that the child + stamp-game or child + square-root-board constitutes a case of what contemporary philosophers call “extended cognition,” that is, a “cognitive process … constituted or realized by resources distributed across the brain, the body, and the environment” Kirchhoff & Kiverstein (Extended consciousness and predictive processing: A third wave view, 2019, 8). Here we highlight that extended cognitive systems can not merely enact mathematical operations but can actualize mathematical understanding.
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (5) , 1-30
Open AccessMontessori, math, and materials: a case of extended cognition
In this article, we bring Maria Montessori’s pedagogy into conversation with contemporary developments in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. In particular, we seek to show that Montessori’s “prepared environment” provides a context within which cognitive tasks are performed in the interfaces and interactions among brains, bodies, and concrete mathematical materials. For ease of illustration, we will focus on one particular Montessori material—the “Stamp Game,” used by children of approximately ages 4–7 for ordinary arithmetic. In both cases, our goal is, first, to show the way in which this particular material can be enmeshed with a particular child’s brain and body in order to become capable of complex mathematical operations. In that sense, we argue that the child + stamp-game or child + square-root-board constitutes a case of what contemporary philosophers call “extended cognition,” that is, a “cognitive process … constituted or realized by resources distributed across the brain, the body, and the environment” Kirchhoff & Kiverstein (Extended consciousness and predictive processing: A third wave view, 2019, 8). Here we highlight that extended cognitive systems can not merely enact mathematical operations but can actualize mathematical understanding.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 29 (3) , 513-518
Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Will at the Crossroads: An Essay on the Failings of Practical Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. pp. xvi + 188. ISBN 9780192896032 (hbk) $80.00
Deduction? It is arguably not, in which case the B-Deduction has addressed the issue of a circle between the unity of apperception and the imagination's synthesis from the A-Deduction by showing how the imagination is subordinated to the understanding. Séguy-Duclot thinks not, and his excursus into the third Critique creates an opportunity for interesting novel interpretations of key sections of the Analytic of the Judgement of Taste (pp. 243-61). His overall verdict about the Deduction is that, in systematic terms, it avoids circularity but at the cost of a restricted ambition, which does not explore the sources of knowledge lying outside consciousness (pp. 272-3). Whether one agrees with this overall verdict, there is no doubt that this book presents Kantian scholars with a novel interpretative approach which is solidly grounded in a careful analysis of especially the A-Deduction. Though on a first reading the structure of the book itself appears somewhat fragmented with lots of reprises, the overall systematicity of Séguy-Duclot's interpretation is impressive, as several problems concerning the details of the Deduction are related to the issues he identifies in the overall structure of the Deduction.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 29 (3) , 513-518
Open AccessJens Timmermann, Kant’s Will at the Crossroads: An Essay on the Failings of Practical Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. pp. xvi + 188. ISBN 9780192896032 (hbk) $80.00
Deduction? It is arguably not, in which case the B-Deduction has addressed the issue of a circle between the unity of apperception and the imagination's synthesis from the A-Deduction by showing how the imagination is subordinated to the understanding. Séguy-Duclot thinks not, and his excursus into the third Critique creates an opportunity for interesting novel interpretations of key sections of the Analytic of the Judgement of Taste (pp. 243-61). His overall verdict about the Deduction is that, in systematic terms, it avoids circularity but at the cost of a restricted ambition, which does not explore the sources of knowledge lying outside consciousness (pp. 272-3). Whether one agrees with this overall verdict, there is no doubt that this book presents Kantian scholars with a novel interpretative approach which is solidly grounded in a careful analysis of especially the A-Deduction. Though on a first reading the structure of the book itself appears somewhat fragmented with lots of reprises, the overall systematicity of Séguy-Duclot's interpretation is impressive, as several problems concerning the details of the Deduction are related to the issues he identifies in the overall structure of the Deduction.
- Open Access
- 28 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 27 (3) , 475-481
What is the Idea of the Soul? Comments on Katharina Kraus, Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation
These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense.
- 28 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 27 (3) , 475-481
Open AccessWhat is the Idea of the Soul? Comments on Katharina Kraus, Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation
These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense.
- 14 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Philosophy of Education
- Vol. 55 (6) , 1097-1111
Discipline and the cultivation of autonomy in Immanuel Kant and Maria Montessori
- 14 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Philosophy of Education
- Vol. 55 (6) , 1097-1111
Discipline and the cultivation of autonomy in Immanuel Kant and Maria Montessori
- 22 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 4781-4789
Maria Montessori
- 11 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 7 (2) , 133-154
The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori
This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.
- 11 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 7 (2) , 133-154
The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori
This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Vol. 101 (4) , 508-534
Character in Kant’s Moral Psychology: Responding to the Situationist Challenge
In recent years, several philosophers have used “situationist” findings in social psychology to criticize character-based ethical theories. After showing how these criticisms apply, prima facie, to Kant’s moral theory, I lay out a Kantian response to them. Kant admits the empirical reality of situation-dependence in human actions but articulates a conception of “ought implies can” that vindicates his character-based moral theory in the face of rarity of character. Moreover, he provides an interpretive framework for the situation-dependence of human motivation in terms of humans’ “propensity to evil.” He also provides a framework for highlighting empirical bases for moral hope, a framework that makes it possible to see lack of character as something human beings can overcome. And he outlines a “moral anthropology” that develops something akin to what Mark Alfano calls “moral technologies,” but in Kant’s case, these technologies focus on cultivating character as such rather than merely good behavioral outcomes.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Vol. 101 (4) , 508-534
Character in Kant’s Moral Psychology: Responding to the Situationist Challenge
In recent years, several philosophers have used “situationist” findings in social psychology to criticize character-based ethical theories. After showing how these criticisms apply, prima facie, to Kant’s moral theory, I lay out a Kantian response to them. Kant admits the empirical reality of situation-dependence in human actions but articulates a conception of “ought implies can” that vindicates his character-based moral theory in the face of rarity of character. Moreover, he provides an interpretive framework for the situation-dependence of human motivation in terms of humans’ “propensity to evil.” He also provides a framework for highlighting empirical bases for moral hope, a framework that makes it possible to see lack of character as something human beings can overcome. And he outlines a “moral anthropology” that develops something akin to what Mark Alfano calls “moral technologies,” but in Kant’s case, these technologies focus on cultivating character as such rather than merely good behavioral outcomes.
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (4) , 509-512
Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy, written by Onora O’Neill
"Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy, written by Onora O’Neill" published on 23 Aug 2019 by Brill.
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (4) , 509-512
Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy, written by Onora O’Neill
"Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy, written by Onora O’Neill" published on 23 Aug 2019 by Brill.
- 24 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (5) , 4123-4144
Situationism and intellectual virtue: a Montessori perspective
- 24 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (5) , 4123-4144
Situationism and intellectual virtue: a Montessori perspective
- 14 January 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 128 (512) , 1344-1355
Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform, by Laura Papish
- 14 January 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 128 (512) , 1344-1355
Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform, by Laura Papish