Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited
- 13 April 2010
- journal article
- other
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 11 (2) , 117-135
Abstract
Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.Keywords
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