The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As
Authors:
- Antoine DubusADAntoine Dubus
- Patrick LegrosPLPatrick Legros
- Stefan BechtoldSBStefan Bechtold
- Andreea Cosnita-LanglaisACAndreea Cosnita-Langlais
- Jacques CrémerJCJacques Crémer
- David GiloDGDavid Gilo
- Jan KrämerJKJan Krämer
- Mathieu ParentiMPMathieu Parenti
- Pierre RégibeauPRPierre Régibeau
- Shiva ShekharSSShiva Shekhar
- Thibaud VergéTVThibaud Vergé
- Patrick WaelbroeckPWPatrick Waelbroeck
Preprint
Abstract
Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. By doing so, they can merge conditionally based on high synergies. Compared to a laissez-faire situation, the presence of a regulator allowing or refusing the M&A may increase or decrease information sharing, with a concomitant increase or decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, regulation can lower the surplus of consumers it is willing to protect. An optimal merger policy combines merger control with mandated data-sharing rules.Keywords
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