The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As

Authors:
  • SBStefan Bechtold
    Stefan Bechtold
  • ACAndreea Cosnita-Langlais
    Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
  • JCJacques Crémer
    Jacques Crémer
  • DGDavid Gilo
    David Gilo
  • JKJan Krämer
    Jan Krämer
  • MPMathieu Parenti
    Mathieu Parenti
  • PRPierre Régibeau
    Pierre Régibeau
  • SSShiva Shekhar
    Shiva Shekhar
  • TVThibaud Vergé
    Thibaud Vergé
  • PWPatrick Waelbroeck
    Patrick Waelbroeck

  • 30 October 2024
    • preprint
    • Published by HAL in HAL
Abstract
Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. By doing so, they can merge conditionally based on high synergies. Compared to a laissez-faire situation, the presence of a regulator allowing or refusing the M&A may increase or decrease information sharing, with a concomitant increase or decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, regulation can lower the surplus of consumers it is willing to protect. An optimal merger policy combines merger control with mandated data-sharing rules.

This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit: