Antoine Dubus
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Antoine Dubus has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Bounie
CREST Télécom Paris Institut Polytechnique de Paris 19 Place Marguerite Perey 91120 Palaiseau France
12 shared publications Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
8 shared publicationsAlessandro Bonatti
7 shared publicationsAxel Gautier
7 shared publicationsBrad Jeon
7 shared publicationsFlavio Legros
7 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1472-1488
The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1472-1488
Top Cited PapersThe Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Adoption of Quantum Computing Technologies
Quantum computing can revolutionize search methods by boosting their cost efficiency. In this paper we analyze under which conditions companies should adopt quantum computing for search problems, by considering the core functioning of quantum search algorithms. Whereas classical search allows incremental discovery-firms learn immediately whether a candidate solution is valid-a quantum search algorithm must inspect all candidates in superposition and can reveal results only after the inspection of all elements is completed. We show that this difference in timing of information revelation fundamentally alters the competitive outcome. In monopoly settings, quantum search provides the expected cost efficiency. Under competition, however, delayed revelation eliminates the economic speedup: when the number of competitors is large, classical search dominates quantum search despite its higher computational cost when there is a premium for early discovery. Quantum adoption becomes optimal only for sufficiently complex problems where search-cost efficiency outweighs the early discovery premium. These results highlight that a quantum speedup does not automatically translate into economic advantage and provide conditions under which firms should adopt quantum search technologies.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Adoption of Quantum Computing Technologies
Quantum computing can revolutionize search methods by boosting their cost efficiency. In this paper we analyze under which conditions companies should adopt quantum computing for search problems, by considering the core functioning of quantum search algorithms. Whereas classical search allows incremental discovery-firms learn immediately whether a candidate solution is valid-a quantum search algorithm must inspect all candidates in superposition and can reveal results only after the inspection of all elements is completed. We show that this difference in timing of information revelation fundamentally alters the competitive outcome. In monopoly settings, quantum search provides the expected cost efficiency. Under competition, however, delayed revelation eliminates the economic speedup: when the number of competitors is large, classical search dominates quantum search despite its higher computational cost when there is a premium for early discovery. Quantum adoption becomes optimal only for sufficiently complex problems where search-cost efficiency outweighs the early discovery premium. These results highlight that a quantum speedup does not automatically translate into economic advantage and provide conditions under which firms should adopt quantum search technologies.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 103
Collecting and selling consumer information: Selling mechanisms matter
- 24 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 103
Open AccessCollecting and selling consumer information: Selling mechanisms matter
- Open Access
Competition and the Two Margins of Privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.
Open AccessCompetition and the Two Margins of Privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 83
Competition and the two margins of privacy
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 83
Open AccessCompetition and the two margins of privacy
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Data Regulation, Platform Encroachment, and the Matthew Effect
Marketplace platforms are central players in online retail and are in an advantageous position to leverage data generated by third-party sellers. This paper analyzes how a platform's encroachment decision--whether to enter its marketplace as a direct competitor--is shaped by regulations that restrict its use of seller data. We show that the platform's encroachment decision follows a non-monotonic pattern: it enters against sellers with either relatively low or sufficiently high brand value, but remains a pure intermediary for intermediate brand values. The data ban regulation alters this strategy by making the platform more likely to exclude low brand-value sellers and more likely to accommodate high brand-value sellers. This creates a Matthew Effect in platform ecosystems: the regulation favors high-value sellers and harms low-value sellers. These results underscore the need for more nuanced regulatory approaches that promote data sharing in emerging markets and targeted bans in mature, established markets to better balance welfare and competition.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessData Regulation, Platform Encroachment, and the Matthew Effect
Marketplace platforms are central players in online retail and are in an advantageous position to leverage data generated by third-party sellers. This paper analyzes how a platform's encroachment decision--whether to enter its marketplace as a direct competitor--is shaped by regulations that restrict its use of seller data. We show that the platform's encroachment decision follows a non-monotonic pattern: it enters against sellers with either relatively low or sufficiently high brand value, but remains a pure intermediary for intermediate brand values. The data ban regulation alters this strategy by making the platform more likely to exclude low brand-value sellers and more likely to accommodate high brand-value sellers. This creates a Matthew Effect in platform ecosystems: the regulation favors high-value sellers and harms low-value sellers. These results underscore the need for more nuanced regulatory approaches that promote data sharing in emerging markets and targeted bans in mature, established markets to better balance welfare and competition.
- Open Access
The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As
Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. By doing so, they can merge conditionally based on high synergies. Compared to a laissez-faire situation, the presence of a regulator allowing or refusing the M&A may increase or decrease information sharing, with a concomitant increase or decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, regulation can lower the surplus of consumers it is willing to protect. An optimal merger policy combines merger control with mandated data-sharing rules.
Open AccessThe Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As
Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. By doing so, they can merge conditionally based on high synergies. Compared to a laissez-faire situation, the presence of a regulator allowing or refusing the M&A may increase or decrease information sharing, with a concomitant increase or decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, regulation can lower the surplus of consumers it is willing to protect. An optimal merger policy combines merger control with mandated data-sharing rules.
- Open Access
Fighting Free with Free: Freemium vs. Piracy
We analyze the optimal business model of a firm facing piracy. The firm either sells a premium version of its product, or also offers a free version along with the premium version. The firm can in turn impose restrictions on the use of the free version. Consumers can choose between the free and the premium version, but can also get an illegal digital copy. We show that freemium offers can reduce digital piracy by fighting free with free and that firms choose their optimal business model depending on the strength of copyright protection. Therefore, the strength of copyright protection can lead firms to choose a traditional business model rather than the new freemium model, impacting significantly the legal usage of the good.
Open AccessFighting Free with Free: Freemium vs. Piracy
We analyze the optimal business model of a firm facing piracy. The firm either sells a premium version of its product, or also offers a free version along with the premium version. The firm can in turn impose restrictions on the use of the free version. Consumers can choose between the free and the premium version, but can also get an illegal digital copy. We show that freemium offers can reduce digital piracy by fighting free with free and that firms choose their optimal business model depending on the strength of copyright protection. Therefore, the strength of copyright protection can lead firms to choose a traditional business model rather than the new freemium model, impacting significantly the legal usage of the good.
- Open Access
- 2 May 2024
- Published by HAL
Competition and the Two Margins of Privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.
- 2 May 2024
- Published by HAL
Open AccessCompetition and the Two Margins of Privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.
- Open Access
The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.
Open AccessThe Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.