Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case of Ptolemaic Astronomy
Open Access
- 11 July 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (4) , 323-344
Abstract
According to selective, retentive, scientific realism, past empirical success may be explained only by the parts of past theories that are responsible of their successful predictions being approximately true, and thus theoretically retained, or approximated, by the parts of posterior theories responsible of the same successful predictions. In this article, we present as case study the transit from Ptolemy’s to Kepler’s astronomy, and their successful predictions for Mars’ orbit. We present an account of Ptolemy’s successful prediction of Mars’ orbit from Kepler’s perspective, and scrutinize whether the theoretical elements responsible for Ptolemy’s empirical success are approximately retained in Kepler. In order to give to the realist the best chances, we try different strategies. We conclude that all fail and thereby this case constitutes a prima facie strong anomaly for selective retentive realism. Structural realists may call preservation of structure to the rescue, but the existing notions of structure do not work. In absence of a new notion that works, the burden of the proof lies on the realist side.Keywords
Funding Information
- Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT-2016-4487, PICT-2016-4487, PICT-2016-4487)
- Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (FFI2016-76799-P, PID2020-115114GB-I00)
- Universitat de Barcelona
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