JDJosé Díez

José Díez

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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José Díez has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Representational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. A (weakly) pragmatist account

    by José Díez

    The goal of this paper is to present, justify and compare to its rivals an account of representational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. The goal is to provide an analysis that is weak enough to be applied to the plethora of different models in empirical science, but strong enough to offer monistic and substantive answers to the problems of directionality, performance and adequacy of scientific representations. The account combines some inherentist and functional aspects adding some essential pragmatic components. In Sect. 1 I start with some introductory and terminological remarks, and the problems and desiderata the account aims to meet. In Sect. 2, I summarize the main features of inherentist and functional accounts, their virtues worth to preserve and their shortcomings to avoid. In Sect. 3 I present the account and how it answers the three problems. In Sect. 4, I assess the account vis a vis its rivals. In the final section I make some concluding remarks.

  • Open Access

    A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences

    by José Díez, David Pineda

    It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.

  • Open Access

    Unification, T-theoreticity, and Testing: The Case of Fitness in Natural Selection

    by José Díez, Santiago Ginnobili, Pablo Lorenzano

    Theoreticity and unification are two main issues discussed in philosophy of science. The first attempts to clarify the different roles of concepts used in a scientific theory. The second concerns the role of unification in scientific explanation and scientific progress. Both discussions have followed separate, independent paths. In this paper, we examine the interrelatedness of these two notions by focusing on classical particle mechanics and the theory of natural selection. We claim that they are interconnected in two distinct ways. On the one hand, a theory’s unifying power relies on the presence of some theoretical concepts that apply to heterogeneous phenomena through the assumption of a (sometimes unstated) general principle. On the other hand, a sensible application of the theoreticity criterion to these integrating concepts requires the unification not being spurious. We conclude that a correct determination of the theoreticty status requires analyzing how specific applications of different parts of a theory interact with each other.


  • Open Access

    Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case of Ptolemaic Astronomy

    by José Díez, Gonzalo Recio, Christian Carman

    According to selective, retentive, scientific realism, past empirical success may be explained only by the parts of past theories that are responsible of their successful predictions being approximately true, and thus theoretically retained, or approximated, by the parts of posterior theories responsible of the same successful predictions. In this article, we present as case study the transit from Ptolemy’s to Kepler’s astronomy, and their successful predictions for Mars’ orbit. We present an account of Ptolemy’s successful prediction of Mars’ orbit from Kepler’s perspective, and scrutinize whether the theoretical elements responsible for Ptolemy’s empirical success are approximately retained in Kepler. In order to give to the realist the best chances, we try different strategies. We conclude that all fail and thereby this case constitutes a prima facie strong anomaly for selective retentive realism. Structural realists may call preservation of structure to the rescue, but the existing notions of structure do not work. In absence of a new notion that works, the burden of the proof lies on the realist side.


  • Open Access

    Guiding Principles and Special Laws†

    by José A. Díez, C. Ulises Moulines

    We analyse the structuralist notion of a guiding principle in empirical science in order to show its fruitfulness to tackle some central issues belonging both to the general as well as to the special philosophy of science, while also providing some clues to understand recent developments in the philosophy of science. We shall conclude by laying out the core characteristics of guiding principles.


  • Open Access

    Frigg and Nguyen, Modelling Nature

    by José Díez

    Home Modelling Nature Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Reviewed by José Díez Modelling Nature: An Opinionated Introduction to Scientific Representation Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Cham: Springer, 2020, £79.99 / £59.99 ISBN 9783030451523 / 9783030451554 Roman Frigg and James Nguyen's Modelling Nature is a comprehensive, critical review of the latest developments in the modelling literature.

  • On the Elusive Formalisation of the Risky Condition for Hypothesis Testing

    by José Díez, Albert Solé

    In this paper, we examine possible formalisations of the riskiness condition for hypothesis testing. First, we informally introduce derivability and riskiness as testing conditions together with the corresponding arguments for refutation and confirmation. Then, we distinguish two different senses of confirmation and focus our discussion on one of them with the aid of a historical example. In the remaining sections, we offer a brief overview of the main references to the risky condition in the literature and scrutinise different options for formally capturing riskiness; we show why none of them works. We conclude with some remarks about the relation between derivability and riskiness and claim that riskiness essentially involves a contextual, pragmatic component that eludes a complete formal reconstruction.

  • Open Access

    Love, Reasons, and Replaceability

    by José A. Díez, Andrea Iacona

    Los amantes suelen tener dos tipos de pensamientos sobre sus seres amados. Por un lado, piensan que algunas cualidades de sus amados les dan motivos para amarlos. Por otro lado, consideran irreemplazables a sus seres amados. Sin embargo, cabe reguntarse cómo pueden coexistir coherentemente estos dos tipos de pensamientos. Si Romeo ama a Julieta en virtud de su forma de ser, ¿no debería amar igualmente a otra mujer con las mismas cualidades? En este artículo establecemos algunas distinciones que consideramos cruciales para la comprensión de las razones para amar. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la afirmación de que los seres amados son irreemplazables es plausible, hay al menos un sentido interesante en el que los amados son reemplazables.