José Díez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
José Díez has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pablo Lorenzano
CEFHIC-Uiversidad Nacional de Quilmes-CONICET, Quilmes, Argentina
4 shared publications - Christián Carlos Carman
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina
2 shared publications - Karina Alleva
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Farmacia y Bioquímica, Departamento de Fisicomatemática, Buenos Aires, Argentina
2 shared publications - Lucía Federico
Centro de Estudios en Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia (CEFHIC), Instituto de Estudios sobre la Ciencia y la Tecnología (IEC), Universidad Nacional de Quilmes / Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero (UNTREF)
2 shared publications - Mercedes Arauzo
Institute of Agricultural Sciences (ICA-CSIC); c/ Serrano 115; dpdo.; 28006 Madrid; Spain
2 shared publications A. Sanz
ETSI Agrónomos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Ciudad Universitaria 28040 Madrid
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (3) , 62
Representational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. A (weakly) pragmatist account
The goal of this paper is to present, justify and compare to its rivals an account of representational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. The goal is to provide an analysis that is weak enough to be applied to the plethora of different models in empirical science, but strong enough to offer monistic and substantive answers to the problems of directionality, performance and adequacy of scientific representations. The account combines some inherentist and functional aspects adding some essential pragmatic components. In Sect. 1 I start with some introductory and terminological remarks, and the problems and desiderata the account aims to meet. In Sect. 2, I summarize the main features of inherentist and functional accounts, their virtues worth to preserve and their shortcomings to avoid. In Sect. 3 I present the account and how it answers the three problems. In Sect. 4, I assess the account vis a vis its rivals. In the final section I make some concluding remarks.
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (3) , 62
Open AccessRepresentational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. A (weakly) pragmatist account
The goal of this paper is to present, justify and compare to its rivals an account of representational modelling as ensemble-plus-standing-for. The goal is to provide an analysis that is weak enough to be applied to the plethora of different models in empirical science, but strong enough to offer monistic and substantive answers to the problems of directionality, performance and adequacy of scientific representations. The account combines some inherentist and functional aspects adding some essential pragmatic components. In Sect. 1 I start with some introductory and terminological remarks, and the problems and desiderata the account aims to meet. In Sect. 2, I summarize the main features of inherentist and functional accounts, their virtues worth to preserve and their shortcomings to avoid. In Sect. 3 I present the account and how it answers the three problems. In Sect. 4, I assess the account vis a vis its rivals. In the final section I make some concluding remarks.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (3) , 1-27
A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.
- 27 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (3) , 1-27
Open AccessA non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.
- Open Access
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- p. 1-21
Unification, T-theoreticity, and Testing: The Case of Fitness in Natural Selection
Theoreticity and unification are two main issues discussed in philosophy of science. The first attempts to clarify the different roles of concepts used in a scientific theory. The second concerns the role of unification in scientific explanation and scientific progress. Both discussions have followed separate, independent paths. In this paper, we examine the interrelatedness of these two notions by focusing on classical particle mechanics and the theory of natural selection. We claim that they are interconnected in two distinct ways. On the one hand, a theory’s unifying power relies on the presence of some theoretical concepts that apply to heterogeneous phenomena through the assumption of a (sometimes unstated) general principle. On the other hand, a sensible application of the theoreticity criterion to these integrating concepts requires the unification not being spurious. We conclude that a correct determination of the theoreticty status requires analyzing how specific applications of different parts of a theory interact with each other.
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- p. 1-21
Open AccessUnification, T-theoreticity, and Testing: The Case of Fitness in Natural Selection
Theoreticity and unification are two main issues discussed in philosophy of science. The first attempts to clarify the different roles of concepts used in a scientific theory. The second concerns the role of unification in scientific explanation and scientific progress. Both discussions have followed separate, independent paths. In this paper, we examine the interrelatedness of these two notions by focusing on classical particle mechanics and the theory of natural selection. We claim that they are interconnected in two distinct ways. On the one hand, a theory’s unifying power relies on the presence of some theoretical concepts that apply to heterogeneous phenomena through the assumption of a (sometimes unstated) general principle. On the other hand, a sensible application of the theoreticity criterion to these integrating concepts requires the unification not being spurious. We conclude that a correct determination of the theoreticty status requires analyzing how specific applications of different parts of a theory interact with each other.
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-25
Scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: the case of classical genetics
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-25
Scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: the case of classical genetics
- Open Access
- 11 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (4) , 323-344
Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case of Ptolemaic Astronomy
According to selective, retentive, scientific realism, past empirical success may be explained only by the parts of past theories that are responsible of their successful predictions being approximately true, and thus theoretically retained, or approximated, by the parts of posterior theories responsible of the same successful predictions. In this article, we present as case study the transit from Ptolemy’s to Kepler’s astronomy, and their successful predictions for Mars’ orbit. We present an account of Ptolemy’s successful prediction of Mars’ orbit from Kepler’s perspective, and scrutinize whether the theoretical elements responsible for Ptolemy’s empirical success are approximately retained in Kepler. In order to give to the realist the best chances, we try different strategies. We conclude that all fail and thereby this case constitutes a prima facie strong anomaly for selective retentive realism. Structural realists may call preservation of structure to the rescue, but the existing notions of structure do not work. In absence of a new notion that works, the burden of the proof lies on the realist side.
- 11 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (4) , 323-344
Open AccessDoes Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case of Ptolemaic Astronomy
According to selective, retentive, scientific realism, past empirical success may be explained only by the parts of past theories that are responsible of their successful predictions being approximately true, and thus theoretically retained, or approximated, by the parts of posterior theories responsible of the same successful predictions. In this article, we present as case study the transit from Ptolemy’s to Kepler’s astronomy, and their successful predictions for Mars’ orbit. We present an account of Ptolemy’s successful prediction of Mars’ orbit from Kepler’s perspective, and scrutinize whether the theoretical elements responsible for Ptolemy’s empirical success are approximately retained in Kepler. In order to give to the realist the best chances, we try different strategies. We conclude that all fail and thereby this case constitutes a prima facie strong anomaly for selective retentive realism. Structural realists may call preservation of structure to the rescue, but the existing notions of structure do not work. In absence of a new notion that works, the burden of the proof lies on the realist side.
- Open Access
Guiding Principles and Special Laws†
We analyse the structuralist notion of a guiding principle in empirical science in order to show its fruitfulness to tackle some central issues belonging both to the general as well as to the special philosophy of science, while also providing some clues to understand recent developments in the philosophy of science. We shall conclude by laying out the core characteristics of guiding principles.
Open AccessGuiding Principles and Special Laws†
We analyse the structuralist notion of a guiding principle in empirical science in order to show its fruitfulness to tackle some central issues belonging both to the general as well as to the special philosophy of science, while also providing some clues to understand recent developments in the philosophy of science. We shall conclude by laying out the core characteristics of guiding principles.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2021
- Published by Front Matter
Frigg and Nguyen, Modelling Nature
Home Modelling Nature Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Reviewed by José Díez Modelling Nature: An Opinionated Introduction to Scientific Representation Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Cham: Springer, 2020, £79.99 / £59.99 ISBN 9783030451523 / 9783030451554 Roman Frigg and James Nguyen's Modelling Nature is a comprehensive, critical review of the latest developments in the modelling literature.
- 25 October 2021
- Published by Front Matter
Open AccessFrigg and Nguyen, Modelling Nature
Home Modelling Nature Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Reviewed by José Díez Modelling Nature: An Opinionated Introduction to Scientific Representation Roman Frigg and James Nguyen Cham: Springer, 2020, £79.99 / £59.99 ISBN 9783030451523 / 9783030451554 Roman Frigg and James Nguyen's Modelling Nature is a comprehensive, critical review of the latest developments in the modelling literature.
- 2 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 34 (4) , 199-219
On the Elusive Formalisation of the Risky Condition for Hypothesis Testing
In this paper, we examine possible formalisations of the riskiness condition for hypothesis testing. First, we informally introduce derivability and riskiness as testing conditions together with the corresponding arguments for refutation and confirmation. Then, we distinguish two different senses of confirmation and focus our discussion on one of them with the aid of a historical example. In the remaining sections, we offer a brief overview of the main references to the risky condition in the literature and scrutinise different options for formally capturing riskiness; we show why none of them works. We conclude with some remarks about the relation between derivability and riskiness and claim that riskiness essentially involves a contextual, pragmatic component that eludes a complete formal reconstruction.
- 2 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 34 (4) , 199-219
On the Elusive Formalisation of the Risky Condition for Hypothesis Testing
In this paper, we examine possible formalisations of the riskiness condition for hypothesis testing. First, we informally introduce derivability and riskiness as testing conditions together with the corresponding arguments for refutation and confirmation. Then, we distinguish two different senses of confirmation and focus our discussion on one of them with the aid of a historical example. In the remaining sections, we offer a brief overview of the main references to the risky condition in the literature and scrutinise different options for formally capturing riskiness; we show why none of them works. We conclude with some remarks about the relation between derivability and riskiness and claim that riskiness essentially involves a contextual, pragmatic component that eludes a complete formal reconstruction.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
- Vol. 53 (158) , 3–21
Love, Reasons, and Replaceability
Los amantes suelen tener dos tipos de pensamientos sobre sus seres amados. Por un lado, piensan que algunas cualidades de sus amados les dan motivos para amarlos. Por otro lado, consideran irreemplazables a sus seres amados. Sin embargo, cabe reguntarse cómo pueden coexistir coherentemente estos dos tipos de pensamientos. Si Romeo ama a Julieta en virtud de su forma de ser, ¿no debería amar igualmente a otra mujer con las mismas cualidades? En este artículo establecemos algunas distinciones que consideramos cruciales para la comprensión de las razones para amar. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la afirmación de que los seres amados son irreemplazables es plausible, hay al menos un sentido interesante en el que los amados son reemplazables.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
- Vol. 53 (158) , 3–21
Open AccessLove, Reasons, and Replaceability
Los amantes suelen tener dos tipos de pensamientos sobre sus seres amados. Por un lado, piensan que algunas cualidades de sus amados les dan motivos para amarlos. Por otro lado, consideran irreemplazables a sus seres amados. Sin embargo, cabe reguntarse cómo pueden coexistir coherentemente estos dos tipos de pensamientos. Si Romeo ama a Julieta en virtud de su forma de ser, ¿no debería amar igualmente a otra mujer con las mismas cualidades? En este artículo establecemos algunas distinciones que consideramos cruciales para la comprensión de las razones para amar. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la afirmación de que los seres amados son irreemplazables es plausible, hay al menos un sentido interesante en el que los amados son reemplazables.
- 28 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 115-131
Scientific Representation as Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For: A Moderate Fictionalist Account
- 28 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 115-131
Scientific Representation as Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For: A Moderate Fictionalist Account