Online budget-feasible mechanism design with predictions
Authors:
- Georgios AmanatidisGeorgios Amanatidis
- Evangelos MarkakisEMEvangelos Markakis
- Christodoulos SantorinaiosCSChristodoulos Santorinaios
- Guido SchäferGSGuido Schäfer
- Panagiotis TsamopoulosPTPanagiotis Tsamopoulos
- Artem TsikiridisATArtem Tsikiridis
Open Access
- 23 September 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 1087
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- European Research Council (101034253)
- European Commission (H.F.R.I. Project Number: 15877)
- NextGenerationEU (MIS 5154714)
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (024.002.003)
- Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
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