The a-theory of time, temporal passage, and comprehensiveness
Author:
Open Access
- 11 April 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (2) , 1-20
Abstract
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.Keywords
Funding Information
- Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung)
- Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
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