BEBahadir Eker

Bahadir Eker

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Bahadir Eker has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Change, temporal qualification, fragmentation

    by Bahadir Eker

    It is a truism that things undergo qualitative change. All traditional accounts of what qualitative change consists in involve some form of temporal qualification, even though it is a matter of controversy which elements of reality are supposed to be affected by it and how deep it runs. This paper examines an alternative approach that is opposed to temporal qualification across the board: hyper-atemporalism . It has been argued recently that hyper-atemporalism, when combined with a fragmentalist metaphysics of temporal reality, delivers the most robust account of genuine qualitative change. This paper argues in response that a view of this kind not only fails in this regard but actually renders qualitative change impossible.


  • How Not to Defend Aesthetic Autonomism

    by Bahadir Eker

    Aesthetic autonomism is standardly defined as the view that the aesthetic value of an artwork in no way depends on its moral value, and hence that considerations about the latter are irrelevant to aesthetic evaluation. However, it has recently been argued that definitions along these lines involve certain flaws and that autonomism should be characterized instead as the view that it is rationally permissible not to adjust one’s initial aesthetic judgment about a work in light of how one evaluates it morally. This paper argues that this proposal is seriously misguided in three central respects: its focus on evaluative adjustments is objectionably narrow and ignores other forms of evaluative conduct; its appeal to rationality misconstrues the core commitments of non-autonomists; and its permissivist character results in a distortion of what is at stake in the debate about the autonomy of the aesthetic.


  • Open Access

    Realism about tense and atemporality

    by Bahadir Eker

    Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality’s constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.


  • Open Access

    Perspectivalism about temporal reality

    by Bahadir Eker

    It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis ofdeep temporalitytypically involves two ideas: that reality istemporally compartmentalisedinto distinct present, past, and future ‘realms’, and that this compartmentalisation istemporally dynamicin the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality betensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach,perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts.


  • Open Access

    The a-theory of time, temporal passage, and comprehensiveness

    by Bahadir Eker

    It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.


  • Open Access

    Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change

    by Bahadır Eker

    According to Fine’s (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz (As time goes by: eternal facts in an ageing universe. Mentis, Paderborn, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.


  • Rationality, time and normativity: On Hedden’s time-slice rationality

    by Sabine A. Döring, Bahadir Eker

    In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.