Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
- 1 December 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 121 (3) , 463-467
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This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Splitting an Uncertain (Natural) CapitalSSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
- Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of RulesJournal of Economic Surveys, 2005
- Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource ModelJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2001
- Entry Deterrence in the CommonsInternational Economic Review, 1994