The monitoring ability of subordinate executives: Evidence from corporate labor violations
Authors:
- Hamdi Ben-NasrHBHamdi Ben-Nasr
- Mehdi KhedmatiMKMehdi Khedmati
- Mohammed Aminu SualihuMSMohammed Aminu Sualihu
Preprint
- 21 May 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We examine the impact of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations and find that subordinate executives with long-term horizon are associated with fewer labor violations. This finding is supported when we compare changes in corporate labor violations around subordinate executives’ sudden departures. We identify the establishment of employee-related board committees as the channel through which subordinate executives affect corporate labor violations. Moreover, we document that the effect of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations is stronger in firms (1) with greater customer, government, and board monitoring, (2) whose CEOs have been in office for a longer period, and (3) whose CEOs are older than their subordinate executives. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that subordinate executives with a long-term horizon are beneficial to the firm.Keywords
This publication has 32 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate labor violations: Do CEOs’ public charity affiliations matter?Journal of Banking & Finance, 2025
- Subordinate executives’ horizon and cash holdingsInternational Review of Economics & Finance, 2024
- Do corporate taxes affect employee welfare? Evidence from workplace safetyJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2023
- Financial misconduct and employee mistreatment: Evidence from wage theftReview of Accounting Studies, 2021
- Major government customers and loan contract termsReview of Accounting Studies, 2021
- CEO career horizon, corporate governance, and real options: The role of economic short‐termismStrategic Management Journal, 2018
- The real effects of mandated information on social responsibility in financial reports: Evidence from mine-safety recordsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2017
- Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon, Top Management Composition, and R&D IntensityHuman Resource Management, 2015
- When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder OwnershipJournal of Business Ethics, 2014
- Corporate governance and firm valuationJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2006