Mohammed Aminu Sualihu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohammed Aminu Sualihu has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ali Sheikhbahaei
Monash University
1 shared publication - Christo Karuna
Monash University
1 shared publication Hamdi Ben-Nasr
1 shared publication- Mariem Khalifa
College of Business, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
1 shared publication Mehdi Khedmati
1 shared publication- Mehdi Khedmati
Department of Accounting, Monash Business School Monash University Melbourne Victoria Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Accounting Comparability and Labor-Related Misconduct
We document a positive association between accounting comparability and labor-related misconduct for a large sample of U.S. firms. The positive association between accounting comparability and labor-related misconduct is stronger with higher information asymmetry, financial constraints, and incentives to beat earnings forecasts. We identify abnormal labor costs as a channel through which accounting comparability affects labor-related misconduct. Together, our study points to an adverse consequence of accounting comparability in contrast to prior studies that overwhelmingly document benefits.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAccounting Comparability and Labor-Related Misconduct
We document a positive association between accounting comparability and labor-related misconduct for a large sample of U.S. firms. The positive association between accounting comparability and labor-related misconduct is stronger with higher information asymmetry, financial constraints, and incentives to beat earnings forecasts. We identify abnormal labor costs as a channel through which accounting comparability affects labor-related misconduct. Together, our study points to an adverse consequence of accounting comparability in contrast to prior studies that overwhelmingly document benefits.
- Open Access
- 21 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The monitoring ability of subordinate executives: Evidence from corporate labor violations
We examine the impact of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations and find that subordinate executives with long-term horizon are associated with fewer labor violations. This finding is supported when we compare changes in corporate labor violations around subordinate executives’ sudden departures. We identify the establishment of employee-related board committees as the channel through which subordinate executives affect corporate labor violations. Moreover, we document that the effect of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations is stronger in firms (1) with greater customer, government, and board monitoring, (2) whose CEOs have been in office for a longer period, and (3) whose CEOs are older than their subordinate executives. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that subordinate executives with a long-term horizon are beneficial to the firm.
- 21 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe monitoring ability of subordinate executives: Evidence from corporate labor violations
We examine the impact of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations and find that subordinate executives with long-term horizon are associated with fewer labor violations. This finding is supported when we compare changes in corporate labor violations around subordinate executives’ sudden departures. We identify the establishment of employee-related board committees as the channel through which subordinate executives affect corporate labor violations. Moreover, we document that the effect of subordinate executives’ horizon on corporate labor violations is stronger in firms (1) with greater customer, government, and board monitoring, (2) whose CEOs have been in office for a longer period, and (3) whose CEOs are older than their subordinate executives. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that subordinate executives with a long-term horizon are beneficial to the firm.
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of International Accounting Research
- p. 1-26
City-Level Employee Education, Workplace Environment, and Audit Fees
In this study, we find that higher city-level employee education is associated with lower audit fees. This finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, alternative model specifications, and endogeneity concerns. We find that this negative relationship is stronger for client firms that treat their employees better. Furthermore, we document that auditors are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for client firms whose employees reside in cities with higher levels of education. Overall, our results show that city-level employee education and its interaction with the workplace environment play an important role in influencing audit fees. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42.
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of International Accounting Research
- p. 1-26
City-Level Employee Education, Workplace Environment, and Audit Fees
In this study, we find that higher city-level employee education is associated with lower audit fees. This finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, alternative model specifications, and endogeneity concerns. We find that this negative relationship is stronger for client firms that treat their employees better. Furthermore, we document that auditors are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for client firms whose employees reside in cities with higher levels of education. Overall, our results show that city-level employee education and its interaction with the workplace environment play an important role in influencing audit fees. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42.