Moving Beyond Contestation: What Is the Way Ahead for the Values-in-Science Debate?
- 9 November 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-20
Abstract
An emergent cluster of theories argues that contestation is key to answering the question of whose values should guide science. This article systematizes this contestatory approach by highlighting how it differs from its main “democratic-alignment” competitor, marking what I describe as a systemic turn in the debate. It then develops two original objections to the contestatory approach, focusing on its overpermissiveness and a missing-evidence problem. Finally, by bringing together those two objections and three classic flaws of democratic alignment, it advances five desiderata for any theory that might aim to break the impasse between democratic alignment and contestation.Keywords
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