Gabriele Badano
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gabriele Badano has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alasia Nuti
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
1 shared publication - Albert Weale
University College London
1 shared publication - Annette Rid
National Institutes of Health
1 shared publication - Anthony J. Culyer
University of York
1 shared publication Catherine Max
Catherine Max Consulting, London, UK
1 shared publication- Christopher McCabe
Institute of Health Economics, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-20
Moving Beyond Contestation: What Is the Way Ahead for the Values-in-Science Debate?
An emergent cluster of theories argues that contestation is key to answering the question of whose values should guide science. This article systematizes this contestatory approach by highlighting how it differs from its main “democratic-alignment” competitor, marking what I describe as a systemic turn in the debate. It then develops two original objections to the contestatory approach, focusing on its overpermissiveness and a missing-evidence problem. Finally, by bringing together those two objections and three classic flaws of democratic alignment, it advances five desiderata for any theory that might aim to break the impasse between democratic alignment and contestation.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-20
Moving Beyond Contestation: What Is the Way Ahead for the Values-in-Science Debate?
An emergent cluster of theories argues that contestation is key to answering the question of whose values should guide science. This article systematizes this contestatory approach by highlighting how it differs from its main “democratic-alignment” competitor, marking what I describe as a systemic turn in the debate. It then develops two original objections to the contestatory approach, focusing on its overpermissiveness and a missing-evidence problem. Finally, by bringing together those two objections and three classic flaws of democratic alignment, it advances five desiderata for any theory that might aim to break the impasse between democratic alignment and contestation.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (5-6) , 1133-1155
Public reason, values in science, and the shifting boundaries of the political forum
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (5-6) , 1133-1155
Public reason, values in science, and the shifting boundaries of the political forum
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 99 (2) , 310-314
Public Reason and Political Autonomy: Realizing the Ideal of a Civic People by Blain Neufeld (Routledge, 2022).
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 99 (2) , 310-314
Public Reason and Political Autonomy: Realizing the Ideal of a Civic People by Blain Neufeld (Routledge, 2022).
- Open Access
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
We need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
Open AccessWe need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 71 (1) , 198-217
Public Reason, Partisanship and the Containment of the Populist Radical Right
This article discusses the growth of the populist radical right as a concrete example of the scenario where liberal democratic ideas are losing support in broadly liberal democratic societies. Our goal is to enrich John Rawls’ influential theory of political liberalism. We argue that even in that underexplored scenario, Rawlsian political liberalism can offer an appealing account of how to promote the legitimacy and stability of liberal democratic institutions provided it places partisanship centre stage. Specifically, we propose a brand-new moral duty binding ‘reasonable’ partisans committed to pluralism. This duty establishes conditions where partisans must strategically transform society’s public reason (i.e. transform the visions for society their parties campaign on) in ways that promise to attract back support from illiberal and antidemocratic competitors. While this strategic behaviour might seem impermissible, we show that Rawls’ distinctive account of sincerity in democratic deliberation is uniquely placed to justify it as perfectly ethical.
- 29 April 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 71 (1) , 198-217
Open AccessPublic Reason, Partisanship and the Containment of the Populist Radical Right
This article discusses the growth of the populist radical right as a concrete example of the scenario where liberal democratic ideas are losing support in broadly liberal democratic societies. Our goal is to enrich John Rawls’ influential theory of political liberalism. We argue that even in that underexplored scenario, Rawlsian political liberalism can offer an appealing account of how to promote the legitimacy and stability of liberal democratic institutions provided it places partisanship centre stage. Specifically, we propose a brand-new moral duty binding ‘reasonable’ partisans committed to pluralism. This duty establishes conditions where partisans must strategically transform society’s public reason (i.e. transform the visions for society their parties campaign on) in ways that promise to attract back support from illiberal and antidemocratic competitors. While this strategic behaviour might seem impermissible, we show that Rawls’ distinctive account of sincerity in democratic deliberation is uniquely placed to justify it as perfectly ethical.
- 22 March 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 68 (1) , 110-127
The Principle of Restraint: Public Reason and the Reform of Public Administration
Normative political theorists have been growing more and more aware of the many difficult questions raised by the discretionary power inevitably left to public administrators. This article aims to advance a novel normative principle, called ‘principle of restraint’, regulating reform of established administrative agencies. I argue that the ability of public administrators to exercise their power in accordance with the requirements of public reason is protected by an attitude of restraint on the part of potential reformers. Specifically, they should refrain from any reform of an administrative agency that involves a switch to a considerably more loosely interconnected system of values underlying the work of that agency. To illustrate the importance of the principle of restraint, I examine a case from British health policy, showing that a recent reform of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence well exemplifies the serious problems brought by any violation of that principle.
- 22 March 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 68 (1) , 110-127
The Principle of Restraint: Public Reason and the Reform of Public Administration
Normative political theorists have been growing more and more aware of the many difficult questions raised by the discretionary power inevitably left to public administrators. This article aims to advance a novel normative principle, called ‘principle of restraint’, regulating reform of established administrative agencies. I argue that the ability of public administrators to exercise their power in accordance with the requirements of public reason is protected by an attitude of restraint on the part of potential reformers. Specifically, they should refrain from any reform of an administrative agency that involves a switch to a considerably more loosely interconnected system of values underlying the work of that agency. To illustrate the importance of the principle of restraint, I examine a case from British health policy, showing that a recent reform of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence well exemplifies the serious problems brought by any violation of that principle.
- 20 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Health Ethics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 176-187
Equality, Liberty and the Limits of Person-centred Care’s Principle of Co-production
The idea that healthcare should become more person-centred is extremely influential. By using recent English policy developments as a case study, this article aims to critically analyse an important element of person-centred care, namely, the belief that to treat patients as persons is to think that care should be ‘co-produced’ by formal healthcare providers and patients together with unpaid carers and voluntary organizations. I draw on insights from political philosophy to highlight overlooked tensions between co-production and values like equality and liberty. Regarding equality, I argue that co-production compounds both problems of gender inequality in the distribution of care labour and the challenges associated with securing equal access to care. Turning to liberty, I identify important commonalities between co-production and republicanism in political philosophy, given their shared insistence on common citizens’ civic virtue. Then, I use against co-production some liberal arguments against republicanism, to highlight a problem of over-demandingness. In bringing my argument to a close, however, I wish to caution against hastily rejecting co-production as a policy programme.
- 20 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Health Ethics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 176-187
Equality, Liberty and the Limits of Person-centred Care’s Principle of Co-production
The idea that healthcare should become more person-centred is extremely influential. By using recent English policy developments as a case study, this article aims to critically analyse an important element of person-centred care, namely, the belief that to treat patients as persons is to think that care should be ‘co-produced’ by formal healthcare providers and patients together with unpaid carers and voluntary organizations. I draw on insights from political philosophy to highlight overlooked tensions between co-production and values like equality and liberty. Regarding equality, I argue that co-production compounds both problems of gender inequality in the distribution of care labour and the challenges associated with securing equal access to care. Turning to liberty, I identify important commonalities between co-production and republicanism in political philosophy, given their shared insistence on common citizens’ civic virtue. Then, I use against co-production some liberal arguments against republicanism, to highlight a problem of over-demandingness. In bringing my argument to a close, however, I wish to caution against hastily rejecting co-production as a policy programme.