Another Mirage of Breaking MIRAGE: Debunking Occupancy-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Fully Associative Randomized Caches
- 27 November 2025
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 25 (1) , 25-28
Abstract
A recent work presented at USENIX Security 2025, Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy (RCO), claims that cache-occupancy-based side-channel attacks can recover AES keys from the MIRAGE randomized cache. In this paper, we examine these claims and find that they arise from a flawed modeling of randomized caches in RCO. Critically, we find that the security properties of randomized caches strongly depend on the seeding methodology used to initialize random number generators (RNG) used in these caches. RCO's modeling uses a constant seed to initialize the cache RNGs for each simulated AES encryption, causing every simulated AES encryption to artificially evict the same sequence of cache lines. This departs from accurate modeling of such randomized caches, where eviction sequences vary randomly for each program execution. We observe that an accurate modeling of such randomized caches, where the RNG seed is randomized in each simulation, causes correlations between AES T-table accesses and attacker observations to disappear, and the attack to fail. These findings show that the previously claimed leakages are due to flawed modeling and that with correct modeling, MIRAGE does not leak AES keys via occupancy based side-channels.Keywords
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Funding Information
- NSERC Discovery (RGPIN-2023-04796)
- NSERC-CSE Research Communities (ALLRP-588144-23)
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