GSGururaj Saileshwar

Gururaj Saileshwar

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Gururaj Saileshwar has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    GPUThor: Amplifying Rowhammer Attacks via Non-Uniform Patterns to Exploit ECC-Protected GPUs

    by Chris S. Lin, Joyce Qu, Aditya Rajeev, Gururaj Saileshwar

  • Another Mirage of Breaking MIRAGE: Debunking Occupancy-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Fully Associative Randomized Caches

    by Chris Cao, Gururaj Saileshwar

    A recent work presented at USENIX Security 2025, Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy (RCO), claims that cache-occupancy-based side-channel attacks can recover AES keys from the MIRAGE randomized cache. In this paper, we examine these claims and find that they arise from a flawed modeling of randomized caches in RCO. Critically, we find that the security properties of randomized caches strongly depend on the seeding methodology used to initialize random number generators (RNG) used in these caches. RCO's modeling uses a constant seed to initialize the cache RNGs for each simulated AES encryption, causing every simulated AES encryption to artificially evict the same sequence of cache lines. This departs from accurate modeling of such randomized caches, where eviction sequences vary randomly for each program execution. We observe that an accurate modeling of such randomized caches, where the RNG seed is randomized in each simulation, causes correlations between AES T-table accesses and attacker observations to disappear, and the attack to fail. These findings show that the previously claimed leakages are due to flawed modeling and that with correct modeling, MIRAGE does not leak AES keys via occupancy based side-channels.


  • Open Access

    AMuLeT: Automated Design-Time Testing of Secure Speculation Countermeasures

    by Bo Fu, Leo Tenenbaum, David Adler, Assaf Klein, Arpit Gogia, Alaa R. Alameldeen, Marco Guarnieri, Mark Silberstein, Oleksii Oleksenko, Gururaj Saileshwar


  • The Mirage of Breaking MIRAGE: Analyzing the Modeling Pitfalls in Emerging “Attacks” on MIRAGE

    by Gururaj Saileshwar, Moinuddin Qureshi

    This paper studies common modeling pitfalls in security analyses of hardware defenses to highlight the importance of accurate reproduction of defenses. We provide a case study of MIRAGE [1], a defense against cache side channel attacks, and analyze its incorrect modeling in a recent work [2] that claimed to break its security. We highlight several modeling pitfalls that can invalidate the security properties of any defense including (a) incomplete modeling of components critical for security, (b) usage of random number generators that are insufficiently random, and (c) initialization of system to improbable states, leading to an incorrect conclusion of a vulnerability, and show how these modeling bugs incorrectly cause set conflicts to be observed in a recent work's [2] model of MIRAGE. We also provide an implementation addressing these bugs that does not incur setconflicts, highlighting that MIRAGE is still unbroken.


  • Mitigating Timing-Based NoC Side-Channel Attacks With LLC Remapping

    by Anurag Kar, Xueyang Liu, Yonghae Kim, Gururaj Saileshwar, Hyesoon Kim, Tushar Krishna

    Recent CPU microarchitectural attacks utilize contention over the NoC to mount covert and side-channel attacks on multicore CPUs and leak information from victim applications. We propose NoIR, a dynamic LLC slice selection mechanism using slice remapping to obfuscate interconnect contention patterns. NoIR reduces contention variance by 92.18% and mean IPC degradation due to cache invalidation is limited to 7.38% for SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks for a 1000-access threshold. While previous defenses focused on redesigning the NoC and routing algorithms, we show that a top-down system-level approach can significantly raise the bar for a NoC security vulnerability with minimal modifications to the NoC hardware.


  • On the Scalability of HeapCheck

    by Rick Boivie, Gururaj Saileshwar, Tong Chen, Benjamin Segal, Alper Buyuktosunoglu

    In our DSN 2021 paper, we introduced HeapCheck, a combination of hardware and software that provides strong protection against memory-safety vulnerabilities with minimal performance overhead. In this short paper, we discuss how HeapCheck can support programs that use very large numbers of objects, and we also compare HeapCheck to two recently announced industry approaches to memory-safety.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Randomized row-swap: mitigating Row Hammer by breaking spatial correlation between aggressor and victim rows

    by Gururaj Saileshwar, Bolin Wang, Moinuddin Qureshi, Prashant J. Nair

    Row Hammer is a fault-injection attack in which rapid activations to a single DRAM row causes bit-flips in nearby rows. Several recent defenses propose tracking aggressor-rows and applying mitigating action on neighboring victim rows by refreshing them. However, all such proposals using victim-focused mitigation preserve the spatial connection between victim and aggressor rows. Therefore, these proposals are susceptible to access patterns causing bit-flips in rows beyond the immediate neighbor. For example, the Half-Double attack causes bit-flips in the presence of victim-focused mitigation. We propose Randomized Row-Swap (RRS), a novel mitigation action that breaks the spatial connection between the aggressor and victim DRAM rows. This enables RRS to provide robust defense against even complex Row Hammer access patterns. RRS is an aggressor-focused mitigation that periodically swaps aggressor-rows with other randomly selected rows in memory. This limits the possible damage in any one locality within the DRAM memory. While RRS can be used with any tracking mechanism, we implement it with a Misra-Gries tracker and target a Row Hammer Threshold of 4.8K activations (similar to the state-of-the-art attacks). Our evaluations show that RRS has negligible slowdown (0.4% on average) and provides strong security guarantees for avoiding Row Hammer bit flips even under several years of continuous attack.


  • Open Access

    HeapCheck: Low-cost Hardware Support for Memory Safety

    by Gururaj Saileshwar, Rick Boivie, Tong Chen, Benjamin Segal, Alper Buyuktosunoglu

    Programs written in C/C++ are vulnerable to memory-safety errors like buffer-overflows and use-after-free. While several mechanisms to detect such errors have been previously proposed, they suffer from a variety of drawbacks, including poor performance, imprecise or probabilistic detection of errors, or requiring invasive changes to the ISA, binary-layout, or source-code that results in compatibility issues. As a result, memory-safety errors continue to be hard to detect and a principal cause of security problems. In this work, we present a minimally invasive and low-cost hardware-based memory-safety checking framework for detecting out-of-bounds accesses and use-after-free errors. The key idea of our mechanism is to re-purpose some of the “unused bits” in a pointer in 64-bit architectures to store an index into a bounds information table that can be used to catch out-bounds errors and use-after-free errors without any change to the binary layout. Using this memory-safety checking framework, we enable HeapCheck, a design for detecting Out-of-bounds and Use-after-free accesses for heap-objects, that are responsible for the majority of memory-safety errors in the wild. Our evaluations using C/C++ SPEC CPU 2017 workloads on Gem5 show that our solution incurs 1.5% slowdown on average, using an 8 KB on-chip SRAM cache for caching bounds-information. Our mechanism allows detection of out-of-bounds errors in user-code as well as in unmodified shared-library functions. Our mechanism has detected out-of-bounds accesses in 87 lines of code in the SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks, primarily in Glibc v2.27 functions, that, to our knowledge, have not been previously detected even with popular tools like Address Sanitizer.


  • Open Access

    Streamline: a fast, flushless cache covert-channel attack by enabling asynchronous collusion

    by Gururaj Saileshwar, Christopher W. Fletcher, Moinuddin Qureshi

    Covert-channel attacks exploit contention on shared hardware resources such as processor caches to transmit information between colluding processes on the same system. In recent years, covert channels leveraging cacheline-flush instructions, such as Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush, have emerged as the fastest cross-core attacks. However, current attacks are limited in their applicability and bit-rate not due to any fundamental hardware limitations, but due to their protocol design requiring flush instructions and tight synchronization between sender and receiver, where both processes synchronize every bit-period to maintain low error-rates. In this paper, we present Streamline, a flush-less covert-channel attack faster than all prior known attacks. The key insight behind the higher channel bandwidth is asynchronous communication. Streamline communicates over a sequence of shared addresses (larger than the cache size), where the sender can move to the next address after transmitting each bit without waiting for the receiver. Furthermore, it ensures that addresses accessed by the sender are preserved in the cache until the receiver has accessed them. Finally, by the time the sender accesses the entire sequence and wraps around, the cache-thrashing property ensures that the previously transmitted addresses are automatically evicted from the cache without any cacheline flushes, which ensures functional correctness while simultaneously improving channel bandwidth. To orchestrate Streamline on a real system, we overcome multiple challenges, such as circumventing hardware optimizations (prefetching and replacement policy), and ensuring that the sender and receiver have similar execution rates. We demonstrate Streamline on an Intel Skylake CPU and show that it achieves a bit-rate of 1801 KB/s, which is 3x to 3.6x faster than the previous fastest Take-a-Way (588 KB/s) and Flush+Flush (496 KB/s) attacks, at comparable error rates. Unlike prior attacks, Streamline only relies on generic properties of caches and is applicable to processors of all ISAs (x86, ARM, etc.) and micro-architectures (Intel, AMD, etc.).