Abstract
We investigate whether the U.S. patent examiner lottery, which is intended to ensure random assignment and equal treatment of applicants, can be strategically manipulated. Using data on four million applications filed between 2001 and 2020, we derive the null distribution of examiner leniency under true randomization and show that many law firms and in-house counsel systematically obtain more lenient examiners than chance would permit. We document multiple mechanisms consistent with strategic manipulation, including leveraging institutional knowledge and exploiting publicly observable examiner workloads. We develop a simple model of manipulation investments that explains which firms are most likely to game the patent lottery and show empirical support for its predictions. Our findings challenge the fairness of the patent lottery. This can have significant welfare implications, both in terms of efficiency – generating as much innovation as possible – and in terms of equity. We further highlight the economic significance of law firms, which, despite their prevalence, have received relatively little empirical attention. Lastly, we call into question empirical designs that rely on examiner randomization for causal identification.