Cameron Ellis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Cameron Ellis has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Benjamin Collier
2 shared publications- Lawrence Powell
Center for Risk and Insurance Research, The Culverhouse College of Business The University of Alabama Tuscaloosa Alabama United States
2 shared publications Adam Solomon
1 shared publicationAnran Li
1 shared publicationBenjamin J. Keys
The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania, Real Estate Department
1 shared publicationEli Liebman
University of Georgia Terry College of Business Athens Georgia USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Playing the Patent Lottery
We investigate whether the U.S. patent examiner lottery, which is intended to ensure random assignment and equal treatment of applicants, can be strategically manipulated. Using data on four million applications filed between 2001 and 2020, we derive the null distribution of examiner leniency under true randomization and show that many law firms and in-house counsel systematically obtain more lenient examiners than chance would permit. We document multiple mechanisms consistent with strategic manipulation, including leveraging institutional knowledge and exploiting publicly observable examiner workloads. We develop a simple model of manipulation investments that explains which firms are most likely to game the patent lottery and show empirical support for its predictions. Our findings challenge the fairness of the patent lottery. This can have significant welfare implications, both in terms of efficiency – generating as much innovation as possible – and in terms of equity. We further highlight the economic significance of law firms, which, despite their prevalence, have received relatively little empirical attention. Lastly, we call into question empirical designs that rely on examiner randomization for causal identification.
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPlaying the Patent Lottery
We investigate whether the U.S. patent examiner lottery, which is intended to ensure random assignment and equal treatment of applicants, can be strategically manipulated. Using data on four million applications filed between 2001 and 2020, we derive the null distribution of examiner leniency under true randomization and show that many law firms and in-house counsel systematically obtain more lenient examiners than chance would permit. We document multiple mechanisms consistent with strategic manipulation, including leveraging institutional knowledge and exploiting publicly observable examiner workloads. We develop a simple model of manipulation investments that explains which firms are most likely to game the patent lottery and show empirical support for its predictions. Our findings challenge the fairness of the patent lottery. This can have significant welfare implications, both in terms of efficiency – generating as much innovation as possible – and in terms of equity. We further highlight the economic significance of law firms, which, despite their prevalence, have received relatively little empirical attention. Lastly, we call into question empirical designs that rely on examiner randomization for causal identification.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
Moral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act
We identify and quantify a new form of welfare loss in insurance markets. We first show theoretically that moral hazard from subsidies for cost‐sharing combined with community rating mimics adverse selection and can unravel insurance markets. To quantify the potential welfare loss, we use exogenous variation in the number of subsidized enrollees on the ACA exchanges. We find that subsidy‐induced moral hazard led to higher premiums, which has lowered enrollment among the unsubsidized by 6.2 percentage points. We estimate the welfare costs of this “moral hazard induced unraveling” to be around 25% of the total welfare loss.
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
Open AccessMoral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act
We identify and quantify a new form of welfare loss in insurance markets. We first show theoretically that moral hazard from subsidies for cost‐sharing combined with community rating mimics adverse selection and can unravel insurance markets. To quantify the potential welfare loss, we use exogenous variation in the number of subsidized enrollees on the ACA exchanges. We find that subsidy‐induced moral hazard led to higher premiums, which has lowered enrollment among the unsubsidized by 6.2 percentage points. We estimate the welfare costs of this “moral hazard induced unraveling” to be around 25% of the total welfare loss.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Real Impacts of Political Spam Filtering
A large share of political fundraising email is routed to spam. Inbox placement for Republican committee email varies by 30 percentage points across mailbox providers on a typical week and moves by comparable amounts within provider over time; higher spam placement tracks lower Google search interest for GOP senators and lower Republican Senate implied probabilities on Kalshi and Polymarket. Two natural experiments in 2025 pin down the fundraising cost: a 78-day episode in which Gmail, Outlook, and Yahoo routed emails containing WinRed donation links to spam while routing otherwise-identical ActBlue-linked emails to the inbox, and a separate Outlook-only placement drop in February-April. First-time donors on WinRed decline-74.6% in donation count during the June episode and-83.2% during the Outlook drop, with no analogous movement in the other DDD cells. The two episodes together cost 142,126 first-time donations over 167 days of filteringroughly 850 missing first-time donations for every day a link-based filter was active, worth about $700,000 in eight-month lifetime donor value per day. Pre-episode WinRed new donors give $461 on their first gift and cumulatively $827 over eight months, so the dollar cost of each missing first gift compounds well beyond the contemporaneous shortfall.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessReal Impacts of Political Spam Filtering
A large share of political fundraising email is routed to spam. Inbox placement for Republican committee email varies by 30 percentage points across mailbox providers on a typical week and moves by comparable amounts within provider over time; higher spam placement tracks lower Google search interest for GOP senators and lower Republican Senate implied probabilities on Kalshi and Polymarket. Two natural experiments in 2025 pin down the fundraising cost: a 78-day episode in which Gmail, Outlook, and Yahoo routed emails containing WinRed donation links to spam while routing otherwise-identical ActBlue-linked emails to the inbox, and a separate Outlook-only placement drop in February-April. First-time donors on WinRed decline-74.6% in donation count during the June episode and-83.2% during the Outlook drop, with no analogous movement in the other DDD cells. The two episodes together cost 142,126 first-time donations over 167 days of filteringroughly 850 missing first-time donations for every day a link-based filter was active, worth about $700,000 in eight-month lifetime donor value per day. Pre-episode WinRed new donors give $461 on their first gift and cumulatively $827 over eight months, so the dollar cost of each missing first gift compounds well beyond the contemporaneous shortfall.
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Capital Costs, Reinsurance, and the Price of Climate Risk
In catastrophe-exposed insurance markets, a large share of what homeowners pay reflects the cost of correlated tail risk. Local insurers cannot diversify these losses on their own and instead transfer them to globally diversified reinsurers, but reinsurance is expensive and volatile. We study a regulatory reform that decreased the capital cost of reinsuring tail risk. After the cost decrease, reinsurance use expanded by 25%, the reinsurance market became less concentrated, and the model-implied price of reinsurance fell by a third. By reducing required capital, the reform also increased insurers' exposure to reinsurer non-payment risk. We show this dramatically impacted the primary insurance market in hurricane-exposed areas of Florida: additional insurers entered and the cost of insuring wind risk fell sharply. To quantify welfare, we estimate an equilibrium model of the Florida wind-insurance market. The model implies that the reform reduced treated insurers' marginal cost of supplying wind coverage by about 10% and lowered equilibrium premiums by about 14%. Counterfactual simulations imply consumer-surplus gains of $186 per household per year, split roughly equally across direct cost pass-through, strategic markup adjustment, and expanded product availability. Our results imply that capital costs required to cover tail events, over and above average losses, meaningfully contribute to consumers' premiums and that policies that reduce those capital costs can decrease prices and improve availability for homeowners insurance.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCapital Costs, Reinsurance, and the Price of Climate Risk
In catastrophe-exposed insurance markets, a large share of what homeowners pay reflects the cost of correlated tail risk. Local insurers cannot diversify these losses on their own and instead transfer them to globally diversified reinsurers, but reinsurance is expensive and volatile. We study a regulatory reform that decreased the capital cost of reinsuring tail risk. After the cost decrease, reinsurance use expanded by 25%, the reinsurance market became less concentrated, and the model-implied price of reinsurance fell by a third. By reducing required capital, the reform also increased insurers' exposure to reinsurer non-payment risk. We show this dramatically impacted the primary insurance market in hurricane-exposed areas of Florida: additional insurers entered and the cost of insuring wind risk fell sharply. To quantify welfare, we estimate an equilibrium model of the Florida wind-insurance market. The model implies that the reform reduced treated insurers' marginal cost of supplying wind coverage by about 10% and lowered equilibrium premiums by about 14%. Counterfactual simulations imply consumer-surplus gains of $186 per household per year, split roughly equally across direct cost pass-through, strategic markup adjustment, and expanded product availability. Our results imply that capital costs required to cover tail events, over and above average losses, meaningfully contribute to consumers' premiums and that policies that reduce those capital costs can decrease prices and improve availability for homeowners insurance.
- Open Access
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 93 (3) , 575-602
Moral hazard on the ACA exchanges: Evidence from a cost‐sharing subsidy discontinuity
This paper examines the moral hazard effects of cost‐sharing subsidies on the Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Exchanges. Exploiting a sharp discontinuity in subsidy generosity at 150% of the federal poverty level, we compare healthcare spending for individuals just above and below this threshold using a regression discontinuity design and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We find that individuals just below 150% federal poverty level who receive the most generous subsidies spend approximately $1860 more annually on healthcare compared to those just above the threshold receiving less generous subsidies, implying an elasticity of −0.52. Several analyses suggest this discontinuity reflects moral hazard rather than adverse selection or health differences across the income threshold. The results highlight the significant impact of moral hazard induced by generous cost‐sharing subsidies, with important implications for the design of means‐tested health insurance subsidies.
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 93 (3) , 575-602
Open AccessMoral hazard on the ACA exchanges: Evidence from a cost‐sharing subsidy discontinuity
This paper examines the moral hazard effects of cost‐sharing subsidies on the Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Exchanges. Exploiting a sharp discontinuity in subsidy generosity at 150% of the federal poverty level, we compare healthcare spending for individuals just above and below this threshold using a regression discontinuity design and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We find that individuals just below 150% federal poverty level who receive the most generous subsidies spend approximately $1860 more annually on healthcare compared to those just above the threshold receiving less generous subsidies, implying an elasticity of −0.52. Several analyses suggest this discontinuity reflects moral hazard rather than adverse selection or health differences across the income threshold. The results highlight the significant impact of moral hazard induced by generous cost‐sharing subsidies, with important implications for the design of means‐tested health insurance subsidies.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Source of Nonprofit Risk Aversion: Theory and Evidence from Hospitals
We show that donors, not managers, drive risk-averse behavior in nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Theoretically, when donor recognition is tiered (e.g., naming rights vs.\ thank-you cards), donors concentrate rather than diversify giving, making shadow donation capital costs sensitive to NPO-specific risk. This induces risk-averse actions even without risk-averse managers. We test our theory using hospitals and the staggered adoption of medical liability caps and find that reduced NPO risk increases donations. Effects on substitute bond-financing indicate this increase is supply- (donor-) driven, not demand- (manager-) driven. Liability caps lead nonprofit hospitals to expand risky investments faster than for-profits, improving patient health.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Source of Nonprofit Risk Aversion: Theory and Evidence from Hospitals
We show that donors, not managers, drive risk-averse behavior in nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Theoretically, when donor recognition is tiered (e.g., naming rights vs.\ thank-you cards), donors concentrate rather than diversify giving, making shadow donation capital costs sensitive to NPO-specific risk. This induces risk-averse actions even without risk-averse managers. We test our theory using hospitals and the staggered adoption of medical liability caps and find that reduced NPO risk increases donations. Effects on substitute bond-financing indicate this increase is supply- (donor-) driven, not demand- (manager-) driven. Liability caps lead nonprofit hospitals to expand risky investments faster than for-profits, improving patient health.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Local Fiscal Consequences of State Sports-Betting Tax Policy
Thirty-eight states have legalized sports betting since 2018, yet policy debates ignore local governments. We ask whether state sports betting policy affects local fiscal health. Using municipal bond yields (2018-2024) and Census of Governments data (2017-2022), we estimate an imputation difference-indifferences model exploiting staggered legalization and cross-sectional variation in tax rates. Legalization improves local fiscal conditions, but higher state tax rates diminish these gains. Across all legalizing states, bond yields fall by approximately 10 basis points and municipal sales tax revenue rises by roughly $44,000 per municipality. At the median tax rate (15%), the yield reduction is approximately 14 basis points and the revenue gain is roughly $36,000. Each percentage point increase in the state tax rate erodes these benefits. We find no extensive-margin effect on intergovernmental transfers, suggesting effects flow through consumer spending rather than revenue-sharing.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLocal Fiscal Consequences of State Sports-Betting Tax Policy
Thirty-eight states have legalized sports betting since 2018, yet policy debates ignore local governments. We ask whether state sports betting policy affects local fiscal health. Using municipal bond yields (2018-2024) and Census of Governments data (2017-2022), we estimate an imputation difference-indifferences model exploiting staggered legalization and cross-sectional variation in tax rates. Legalization improves local fiscal conditions, but higher state tax rates diminish these gains. Across all legalizing states, bond yields fall by approximately 10 basis points and municipal sales tax revenue rises by roughly $44,000 per municipality. At the median tax rate (15%), the yield reduction is approximately 14 basis points and the revenue gain is roughly $36,000. Each percentage point increase in the state tax rate erodes these benefits. We find no extensive-margin effect on intergovernmental transfers, suggesting effects flow through consumer spending rather than revenue-sharing.
- Open Access
- 29 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 92 (3) , 665-691
Registered index‐linked annuities in qualified retirement plans
Many Americans remain financially underprepared for retirement. While automatic enrollment in employer‐sponsored retirement plans has helped, target‐date funds (TDFs) used as default investments have limitations. We propose target‐date registered index‐linked annuities (TD‐RILAs) as a transparent, cost‐effective alternative providing decreasing equity exposure over time. A theoretical analysis explores TD‐RILAs' optimal structure and compares them to TDFs. A lab experiment examines investors' preferences, product transparency, default choices, and the role of information. We find that TD‐RILAs are a suitable addition to retirement plans, potentially rivaling TDFs.
- 29 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 92 (3) , 665-691
Open AccessRegistered index‐linked annuities in qualified retirement plans
Many Americans remain financially underprepared for retirement. While automatic enrollment in employer‐sponsored retirement plans has helped, target‐date funds (TDFs) used as default investments have limitations. We propose target‐date registered index‐linked annuities (TD‐RILAs) as a transparent, cost‐effective alternative providing decreasing equity exposure over time. A theoretical analysis explores TD‐RILAs' optimal structure and compares them to TDFs. A lab experiment examines investors' preferences, product transparency, default choices, and the role of information. We find that TD‐RILAs are a suitable addition to retirement plans, potentially rivaling TDFs.
- 12 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 31 (9) , 1878-1897
Medical cannabis and automobile accidents: Evidence from auto insurance
While many states have legalized medical cannabis, many unintended consequences remain under‐studied. We focus on one potential detriment–the effect of cannabis legalization on automobile safety. We examine this relationship through auto insurance premiums. Employing a modern difference‐in‐differences framework and zip code‐level premium data from 2014 to 2019, we find that premiums declined, on average, by $22 per year following medical cannabis legalization. The effect is more substantial in areas near a dispensary and in areas with a higher prevalence of drunk driving before legalization. We estimate that existing legalization has reduced health expenditures related to auto accidents by almost $820 million per year with the potential for a further $350 million reduction if legalized nationally.
- 12 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 31 (9) , 1878-1897
Medical cannabis and automobile accidents: Evidence from auto insurance
While many states have legalized medical cannabis, many unintended consequences remain under‐studied. We focus on one potential detriment–the effect of cannabis legalization on automobile safety. We examine this relationship through auto insurance premiums. Employing a modern difference‐in‐differences framework and zip code‐level premium data from 2014 to 2019, we find that premiums declined, on average, by $22 per year following medical cannabis legalization. The effect is more substantial in areas near a dispensary and in areas with a higher prevalence of drunk driving before legalization. We estimate that existing legalization has reduced health expenditures related to auto accidents by almost $820 million per year with the potential for a further $350 million reduction if legalized nationally.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Cost of Consumer Collateral: Evidence from Bunching
How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. One-third of all borrowers select the maximum uncollateralized loan amount, and our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid collateral. Exploiting time variation in the loan amount threshold, we find that collateral causally reduces default rates by 35%. Our results help to explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and uniquely quantify the extent to which collateral reduces moral hazard in consumer credit markets.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Cost of Consumer Collateral: Evidence from Bunching
How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. One-third of all borrowers select the maximum uncollateralized loan amount, and our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid collateral. Exploiting time variation in the loan amount threshold, we find that collateral causally reduces default rates by 35%. Our results help to explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and uniquely quantify the extent to which collateral reduces moral hazard in consumer credit markets.