Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing
- 9 January 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 34 (1-2) , 154-173
Abstract
The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression.Keywords
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