How (not) to pay — Field experimental evidence on the design of REDD + payments
Authors:
- Tim ReutemannTRTim Reutemann
- Stefanie EngelSEStefanie Engel
- Eliana ParejaEPEliana Pareja
- 1 September 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 129, 220-229
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- European FP7 project CiVi.net (282750)
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