Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions
Preprint
- 1 July 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects in the form of stochastic economies or diseconomies of scale. We show that economies give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices, whereas the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Indeed, economies of scale make the second-price format more profitable for the seller, whereas revenue equivalence is preserved in the case of diseconomies.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art AuctionsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1997
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctionsEconomic Theory, 1996
- Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential AuctionsGames and Economic Behavior, 1994
- PREDATORY BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONSOxford Economic Papers, 1994
- Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objectsEconomics Letters, 1994
- The Declining Price AnomalyJournal of Economic Theory, 1993
- SystematicPriceDifferencesBetweenSuccessiveAuctionsare noAnomalyJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1992
- Testing for Price Anomalies in Real Estate Auctions1992
- How Auctions Work for Wine and ArtJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1989
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 1982