Economic Sanctions: Ownership Regimes vs Formal Rights
- 1 January 2026
- journal article
- Published by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in World Economy and International Relations
- Vol. 70 (8)
Abstract
The protection of property rights is one of the key factors for the sustainable development of an economic system based on voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. This applies to the international economic system in the era of globalization: in the case of international assets, the protection of rights is ensured by the fundamental principles of international law and is largely de facto based on trust in a number of jurisdictions that have historically developed a reputation as reliable harbors for asset allocation. However, the current geopolitical tensions and related international economic sanctions are exacerbating the problem of asset ownership protection at the international level. Using the example of an analysis of the situation with the freezing (and possible confiscation) of Russian international reserves in the EU, the problem of property rights erosion in international law is investigated. It is shown how, while retaining the formal title of ownership, there is a forced transfer of particular rights, which de facto leads to the confiscation of the asset, although de jure the formal title of ownership remains with the previous owner. This situation becomes possible due to the discrepancy between property regimes and formal property titles – if formal titles are not supported by real mechanisms for their protection, then they de facto cease to operate. Actions aimed at such dilution of powers undermine the institutional foundations of healthy international economic relations – their effects are long-term and may require greater efforts to restore confidence in the system of international law in the future. Based on the case considered, the issue of the universality of the application of neoclassical assumptions to the methodology of law and economics is also discussed: the analysis of current benefits and costs for stakeholders can serve as a justification for such asset confiscation, and the long-term consequences of the decision usually go beyond the scope of the analysis. The study can be useful in shaping foreign economic policy regarding the protection of ownership rights to foreign assets – in particular, it offers such protection tools as the exchange of collateral.Keywords
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